Judging B-School Admissions Chances

I'm thinking of applying to a couple of name-brand business schools that I'm competitive for.

I assess that I'm competitive because my scores are well within the range of the schools' class profiles.  However, what would really help me out in assessing my chances would be knowing the characteristics of the applicant pool.  I am particularly interested in correlation of GMAT scores with admit rates.

For instance, say School A has an applicant pool of 10000, and admits 1000.  The admit rate is 10%.  Then the school comes out and says its admit profile has a middle 50% GMAT range of (for instance) 690-750.  This is wonderful, and with the 80% spread can give a pretty good picture of what the normalized curve for the entering class looks like.  But that tells me nothing about my chances before I get in; it merely says how I'll fit in once I get there.

If I had the applicant pool profile, then I could match up the normal curve of the applicant pool with that of the admit pool--overlay them, almost-- and see if the left end of the Applicant GMAT curve significantly overlaps the left end of the Admit GMAT curve significantly enough to rule out most of the low-end of the applicant pool.

Note that schools do not release profiles of their applicant pools.  This must be to increase the number of people applying by preventing people from seeing that they don't have a very good chance of getting in.  They can claim to be a) not basing admissions on test scores, and b) getting lots of applicants to get their admit ratios low and keep exclusivity up.  In other words, they are having their cake and eating it too.

I assess that the 10% admit rate in the example is actually closer to 40%, maybe 50%, of qualified candidates, i.e. those that  match the general class profile.  Now, to be truthful, I do not have any statistics to back that up, other than to say that the mean GMAT score nationwide is around 530, and that a lot of people apply to exclusive schools just because they are exclusive.  Assuming that 2/3 of the GMAT test-takers do actually get scores between 400 and 600, as the test is designed, and standard deviation is about 100 points... well, I would be very interested to see the applicant pool stats vs admit pool stats.  I think we'd be very surprised what the admit rate is for people who fit the class admit pool.

While the applicant pool is probably skewed high based on the caliber of school, I don't think that solely geniuses are all applying to Harvard.  Why?  There aren't enough of them for the top-20 schools.  See the next bit..

The applicant pool we're interested in are about 2 standard deviations above the mean--actually, with a 690 and above, we're talking about 1.5 STDEVs above, or in roughly the 94th percentile.  The number of GMAT test-takers last year was 267000.  We'll assume all single, unique testers for this little exercise.

With a total pool of 267000 GMAT test takers, we look at what a score of 690 means percentage-wise (set the mean to 538 and stdev to 100, then move the cursor to 690), multiply by the total GMAT population, and end up with a total of... 16000 people with a minimum 690 GMAT score.  With a 730 GMAT, it becomes 8000 people.  Are all those people applying to the same schools?  There may be some overlap, but let's posit that that all the smart people (690 GMAT and above) apply to the top 10 schools. With average class sizes being about 560, we're talking a total of 5600 top-program slots available.  Assuming that only this year's GMAT takers apply, this means that if everybody with a 690 or above--throughout the world--applied to these top 10 B-schools, we'd see a 30% admit rate.  


This isn't even counting the next 10 ranked b-schools, or other top-ranked international schools, etc.  Wow, the odds just get better and better for scores in that top 6%, don't they?  This tells me that there are a lot of people applying with sub-super GMAT scores, and that those people comprise the majority of the exclusive schools' rejects.

Now, I could be totally off base and all the normal people could be scared off by the high mean GMAT of the schools.  However, this doesn't pass the sniff test.  If I'm average Joe, I might not apply to the exclusive school... but the cost of the application (in time and money) might be worth the return, especially because I know the school admits at least a few low-end scores.  Might be my lucky day, or something.

What we do know then is that a lot of folks apply to multiple schools, and we have a lot of lower-tier GMAT applicants as well.  We also know that top schools admit mostly top GMAT performers.

Keep in mind that the GMAT takers number includes International students as well, which are taking the GMAT in equal or greater numbers to US takers.  What I am leaving out of my analysis is the folks who have legacy GMAT scores (like who keep scores on file for a couple of years and then apply) because 1) not all of the top GMAT takers apply to the exclusive schools, 2) not all GMAT takers apply to schools period, and 3) it's a rolling process, so I assume that the carry-overs from last year replace the ones who wait this year.

So what is the takeaway?  If you're applying to a top B-School or other school that requires the GMAT, and you're facing great odds... like the 10000 apps vs 1000 slots crunch... and you have a high GMAT, you probably don't have to worry about quite as much as you thought you did.  And you can still tell people you got into a really selective school.

If you had an average GMAT, then you need to be really really special, because you're competing with the high scores that comprise the majority of slots, and the low-scores are relatively rare at the selective schools.

I still want to see the applicant pool profile.  But I suspect we never will, because it would mean too much in prestige and applications revenue.

Feedback and help with my math would be greatly appreciated.

Union Theory

This will be a short post, as I am not an economist and haven't done any research on the post-topic.  Also, my jargon will be off because I haven't taken econ in years.

Here it is.
Thesis:  Adding constraints or invalidating economic assumptions creates market distortions.

No suprise there, right?

Sub-Thesis:  Labor unions are an externality caused by the invalidation of the homo economicus assumption of perfect mobility.

Explanation:  When I learned about labor markets in Econ 101, I learned that labor is a commodity (more or less) with its supply and demand curves, et cetera.  One of the things that had to be accounted for in assessing prices and elasticity and so forth was the degree of mobility of the labor in question.  Now, it seems that unions were created because workers weren't getting paid commensurate with their working conditions and labor.  The only reason this could have happened is that there were no other acceptable jobs around, and that the workers couldn't move to the jobs they wanted.

Whether those jobs actually existed is irrelevant to this point.

Now, as the workers couldn't move to a better job, there was a market distortion that benefited the employers, namely a lack of competition for labor.  The employers essentially had a captive labor pool and could pay less than competitive-market prices.  So, as the unions formed, they essentially functioned as a substitute for the perfect mobility that the workers lacked.  They acted as an indirect competitor with the original employer.  This moved the overall supply/demand curve intersection to a point closer to that of optimal efficiency.

This suggests that there is an economically optimal amount of union involvement in a given labor pool or situation.  That amount would be just enough to balance the degree of invalidation in the labor-supply-assumption, or perfect mobility, whatever you want to call it.  Further, if there's an optimal amount of union involvement, that means that there are sub-optimal levels-- too high, and too low--and those levels can be determined and compared against reality.

This is a fun academic exercise.  I think it describes why unions formed and a bit of their history.  For predictive theory, it seems that unions would thrive in environments where the facilities are fixed and labor pools are specialized (hence, they have imperfect mobility) and be unable to keep a foothold where labor is fungible and facilities are widely distributed (or where mobility is greater).  Does this accurately describe reality?

It does not describe union pension plans, however-- I think that will take a more deliberate thought-experiment to explain.

Baghdad Election Booms

This evening I heard small-arms fire (like AK-47s) and explosions (probably RPGs) in the distance as I walked to my CHU.  Over the last several days, we've seen embassy bombings and a massacre.  It seems as though there is mischief afoot.

Personally, I am glad this is happening now.  Here's why:  We are still here.  I would wager that the recent spate of violence is directly related to the recent elections and the Iraqi people's empowerment of Ahmed Allawi.  This did two things.  First, it emboldened Al-Qaeda, which now have another Sunni (and former ba'athist) on the cusp of power.  I don't think Allawi is a bad guy, as he pissed off Saddam pretty good, but he is likely tied through family and tribal relations to some bad people.  Additionally, as he takes over the PM slot, he will inevitably replace current officials with those he prefers-- and those officials are more likely to be tied to Sunni extremist groups than the current officials.  This all adds up to a political climate that might embolden Sunni groups, and I think that's what we're seeing now.

Now, the other side of the coin has the Shi'a contingent (like Nouri Al-Maliki and his contingent) not wanting to relinquish power to the newly-elected government.  So there will be shenanigans from the Shi'a side of the house and its Iranian supporters as Maliki tries to create either a) a reason for him to stay in power, or b) um... another reason for him to stay in power.

This is why I am glad this is happening now.  If Maliki had won, we would probably not be seeing the recent increase in violence.  The long-term effect, however, would be that Iraq would have to go through its first eventual transfer of power on its own and later.  Historically, transfers of power have been a hard thing for middle-eastern countries to deal with.  See: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc.  So for Iraq to confront this election and transfer of power now, when the US is still around to provide a stabilizing influence, is a very good thing over the long term.

There's nothing saying that the political situation won't vaporize when Allawi gets voted out of office in 4 years, but it's a lot more likely to go smoothly if we establish a positive precedent now.  The confidence of the people in the process will go a long way to making this a permanent fixture.  Then, in 20 years, we can look at this moment, right now, and say it was a defining point in Iraq's prosperity.

Surefire controversy!

Let's talk Don't Ask, Don't Tell a bit.  I have served in all-male light infantry and motorized line infantry units, co-ed training units, and co-ed staff units.  I went to the Military Academy, which is a co-ed institution with approximately 17% of the student body being female.  My experience is wide enough that I have a fairly good idea of what goes on in the Army and can therefore comment on some impacts of the policy popularly known as Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT).  

First, let's posit a few things.  

1. Any policy affecting or regulating the military ought to be crafted with the explicit aim of enhancing the capability of the armed forces.  I hope this is apparent.  If you disagree with me on this, then stop reading and go do something else. 

2. Military capability is a function of the total equipment, personnel, and leadership/organizational activity of the military.  It means the ability to deliver the right force to the right target in the right place at the right time.  

3. There are trade-offs inherent in every policy.  To make an analogy, a pawn may move two spaces forward, which is an advance, but the trade-off is that it loses control of the squares it has passed.  

Ok, great.  Now we are on the same page.  So let's address some points about DADT.  

The first is a pretty big one that most people seem to miss.  DADT does NOT PREVENT gays from serving in the military. 

Let me say that again because it is an important point.

DADT does NOT PREVENT gays from serving in the military. 

What it prevents is gays from OPENLY serving in the military.  What does that mean?  That means engaging openly in gay behavior.  The line is a little ambiguous, but public displays of affection such as kissing, or getting caught in flagrante are sufficient to open an investigation into the behavior.  

But nothing in the policy prevents gay servicemembers from serving, provided they do not publish their orientation to the world to see.  And that's the rub.  There could be a couple of infantrymen, gay as can be, serving in a line unit, and, for example, living in their own off-post house, doing whatever they wanted to do.  And there's nothing the Army could do about it.  All that would be required is that they not make out in the barracks in front of their soldiers.  

So, you say, the policy is still discriminatory.  Well, yes, yes it is.  But let's go back to our propositions:  Looking at #1, would repealing DADT enhance military capability?  I don't think so, and here's why. 

1) Gays are already allowed to serve in the military; those who want to can, and therefore the military is not losing a valuable source of manpower.  The best (and only, as far as I am concerned) arguments for allowing blacks, women, and etc into the army and integrated units concern the usage of the whole population of the US in military endeavors.  

Fairness, taking into account peoples' desire to serve, etc., should have nothing to do with whether they are allowed to serve.  To make the point:  If a paraplegic wants to serve in the infantry, do we let him?  If he is a superior strategic genius, then maybe he should be made a general.  However, he is incapable of doing common Infantry tasks.  Women (~50% of the population) and minorities (~30% of the population) give valuable contributions to the military, and so the integration effort was well-aimed and well-implemented, despite the negative effects that we do see in co-ed units from a high-percentage male population interacting with a low-percentage female population, especially given the framework of the rank system.  There is no such argument for repealing DADT, because gays (2-3% of the population) are already allowed in the military.  Repealing DADT would be an exercise in enhancing gay self-esteem, not military readiness.  Consequently, the negative effects that we can anticipate--to unit readiness and morale-- are NOT outweighed by the benefits.   

Because it would not be a beneficial policy, I am forced to conclude that the campaign to repeal DADT is not based so much on "gay rights" as it is on "I'm Gay, Look At Me!" In short, it is about the individual's freedom to do what you want.  Freedom is great-- I am a huge fan of it.  And I am leaving the military so I can do what I want.  There are tradeoffs (see my #3 above) to every decision.  The military demands some degree of conformity.  If you can't handle it, don't join-- you know what you're getting into when you sign up.  However, DADT-repeal proponents would rather force an institution to change for a few individuals' lifestyle preferences than recognize that what they are doing is not in the best interest of the military.  

We then have a branch.  Would DADT repeal be detrimental to the military?  I don't know for sure.  I can say that with the coming confluence of gay marriage and military benefits, I would bet a month's paycheck that with those policies in place, most of my all-male infantry platoon would have gotten "married" to be allowed to use off-post housing and get BAH.  I can't say that my platoon would be significantly degraded by this, but I think getting my soldiers in formation in the morning would be a lot more difficult, and I would see a lot more legal problems coming out of Animal-House style quarters.  I could be wrong, but that's where I would see things going.

I would also guess that living quarters for military service members in general would be dramatically reconfigured.  There would no longer be ANY justification for segregating housing by sex.

Read that again, and think about it.  It's absolutely correct.  What is the justification for segregating housing by sex now?  Privacy?  Sexual harassment cases?  When DADT goes, housing segregation by sex will (logically, but the army doesn't always follow logic) go too.  As a result, service-members will have to have each of their own rooms.  This is great for the servicemembers and I am all in favor of it generally, but not for the cause celebre of some individuals. 

You will notice that I haven't addressed the morale., etc,. of the people in the units.  That is intentional.  My platoons could probably be assessed as homophobic, but I am not sure how much of that was peer-pressure induced and how much of it was genuinely being bothered by gays.  I don't think integrating gays into the units themselves would be a problem unless you had gay romances going on.  That is a problem in male-female integrated units as well, and can have a significant detrimental effect on unit readiness.  It goes to a lot of fraternization issues.  If those could be avoided (which I don't think is entirely realistic) then there wouldn't be a big problem. 

However, let me make a point here:  forcing people to change their beliefs for the sake of forcing them to change is egotistical and wrong.  If there is an injustice going on, fine.  But to label a group of people ("the military") as being mentally deficient and requiring them to adjust to accommodate a relative few individuals is not the best use of the military's already poorly-managed time and energy.  There are already copious opportunities (mandates) for quarterly and yearly training on suicide, sexual harassment, equal opportunity, and so forth.  I got more time in EO classes in my training at Fort Riley than I did training on IVs or calling MEDEVAC.  Just sayin'.

Although to be fair I suppose I am at more risk of an EO complaint here on staff than I am of getting blown up.  But if I'd gone to Afghanistan, then I'd have a real point.  

Are we willing to accept the upheaval that repealing DADT will cause?  I personally don't think there's a point to it.  We should go with my marriage policy, and DADT in place.

Feedback is welcome, as are additional facts or commentary.  

Organizational Ownership Phenomenon

I attended a hail-and-farewell today.  For those of you who haven't attended one, it's one of a long list of Army functions that purport to be tradition and morale-building but actually serves to suck up between one and 3 hours of potentially productive time.  Last night, for instance, over the course of an hour-and-a-half, we learned exactly who of the incoming and outgoing personnel in the 3 shop were married, and some of what they were going to do once re-deployed.  A Colonel sang Irish songs in honor of St. Patrick's Day.  Though all this is no doubt crucial to individual self-esteem and a well-deserved recognition after a year of service in Iraq, I can't remember a single person except the specialist who was publicly mocked by the Sergeant Major for being fat and interested in fantasy role-playing games.  It was a near-total waste of time, except that I got some chicken wings and was able to assess the male/female ratio on the J3 staff to be approximately 20:1.

However, one productive thing did come out of this event.  I came up with yet another reason that the Army is possessed of strong organizational inertia--that is to say, why it doesn't change.  The fact that everybody in this Force-level staff changed out in the period of about a month clued me into this:  Since the typical tour of duty in the Army is between one and three years, no officer has any incentive to take actions to improve his organization past his individual time-frame. 


Hypothesis:  Organizational ownership increases with the anticipated tenure of the individual in the organization.  Ray Kroc and Sam Walton had tremendous senses of organizational ownership because their lives were tied up in growing their businesses.  The typical wal-mart clerk is probably not as enthusiastic.  Likewise, Army officers who constantly change units have no incentive to view their role in the Army in light of the long-term good of their immediate organization because they are moving around so much.


Individual officers do not have the capability or incentives to work on anything that will outlast them.  Therefore, they focus on short-cycle projects that will produce immediate tangible results.  This is where the current deployment-refit-train- cycle (I think it's called something like "Life Cycle Units, or Rotational Readiness program or etc) is very beneficial to the commander.  He works through the cycle, declares victory, and goes on to his next assignment.  He has no staying power or ability to influence anything in his organization past his RIP/TOA date.

This phenomenon is not strictly limited to officers, but it seems to hit them harder.  Within 2 months of my last deployment ending, I'd estimate that 90% of officer-positions changed hands.

So what's the problem?  Well, let me make an analogy: Publicly traded businesses are often derided for taking courses of action that benefit their share prices in the short-term without regard for moral hazard or long-term consequences.  Just think about the recent banking collapse if you need an example.  They are pressured by the public clamor to keep share prices up.  This prevents them from taking actions that might be beneficial to the long-term health of the company (i.e. shedding lines of business, layoffs, etc) but are unpopular.

Apply this to the Army.  A unit commander (or other officer, but I will say "commander" here to keep it simple) has a short-term goal, just like keeping share prices high: Career advancement, i.e. his OER.  After his  2 or 3 years, he moves on to another position in another organization, or a different shop within the same organization-- but more commonly the former.  So his incentive is to do whatever he can do NOW, because he is a) rated on his short term performance, and b) he will not be around long enough to see any long-term projects to completion--hence, anything that has a less-than-sexy performance in the immediate term will hurt him.  Thus, problems have a tendency to be ignored or put off until the rotation happens, to let the next guy deal with it.

So because officers are moved around so much, they have no incentives to take on long-term unit improvements.  They focus on the immediate train-deploy cycle.  They focus on their immediate tour and not on how to build the battalion over years.

But, you ask, isn't that a good thing because of cumulative improvement to the unit?  Surely new commanders, all full of piss and vinegar, reinvigorate organizations and keep them wired tight.

You'd think so, but then account for the fact that all the expertise and teamwork built up during that time frame is constantly decimated by OTHER officers moving around.  The WHOLE ORGANIZATION can change in a period of a couple of months.  Because officers are the ones that set the training and operational agenda, every time a command position changes hands, there is a reorientation of priorities throughout the unit.  Everyone has to adjust to the new boss.  This can happen en-masse--like when the battalion commander and company commanders all change at roughly the same time-- or it can happen piecemeal, with platoon leader rotations, company commander changes, etc.  But every time there is a change, the ship has to adjust course.  In fact, a time-honored tradition in the Army is assuming authority and declaring that the last guy was all messed up and the situation needs to be fixed.  Maybe our current CoC knows something about military culture after all.

The required re-org and re-orientation following personnel turnover simply further reduces the ability of everybody else to make long-term change or adjustments that would improve the organization.  Everybody has to drop what they're doing and learn what the new boss wants.

What kind of long-term organizational improvements are we talking about?  

How about winning wars?  If postings to combat zones were permanent, would we win faster?  How about equipment and accountability problems?  If officers couldn't kick the can down the road as easily, then they might be able and motivated to take action to fix problems.

By the way, this post nicely supports my idea for a free-market HR department, in which units and individuals work at common interests to find good organizational fits, and then retain the leaders that are worth a damn.

Fraud, Waste and Abuse, or Your Tax Dollars At Not-Work

Something that a lot of people mistake is frictional unemployment.  That's the amount of people in a given economy who are between jobs, and represents the normal exchange or flow of labor between sources of production.  It indicates that the market for labor is working.  It's really a useful concept, and puts unemployment rates into context.  4% unemployment?  That's probably really good, based on the actual can't-find-work percentage.  It looks like this:

Can't Find Work = Total Unemployment - Frictional Unemployment

So the Can't Find Work percentage might be actually closer to 1-2% overall.  Pretty good, eh?  A certain amount of frictional unemployment is actually necessary to having a healthy, functioning free-market economy.

That's not what I'm writing about today.  Today's topic is more along the lines of Frictional Employment, a term I'm coining to describe what's happening in my office, and which I will extrapolate to the larger Army and government bureaucracies in general to describe the rampant waste that goes on with the military.

So here's an example.  In my staff section, we have several civilian contractors.  They are very experienced in their fields.  They have spent careers in law enforcement, customs, intel, etc., and are incredible assets in those areas.  They are being paid considerable amounts of money to come overseas and ply their expertise to help assist the US or Gov't of Iraq (GoI) learn about governance, law enforcement, etc.

And they are completely useless.  They are getting paid essentially to sit around because they have been misplaced in my section.  Think about this for a second.  These contractors are getting paid in the six-figures (from what I gather) to be here.  Their contracting company is getting paid some amount that includes profit as well as additional comp packages for the contractors.  So in my shop alone, the US government is spending-- I estimate-- Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (could be more, could be less, but let's call it that for a SWAG, shall we?) to have expertise and experience and sit around and read CNN.

It's not the contractors' fault.  They are hard-working individuals.  They applied for specific jobs, and were accepted, hired, trained, and sent over here.  They have notified their superiors and companies about what's going on.  The US forces know what's going on.  But they stay in this section.  Hence, Frictional Employment is folks being employed where they shouldn't be.

I strongly, strongly suspect based on my time in the office as well as a few other places in this country that this is NOT an isolated occurrence.  So let's multiply my figure of $600K by the Mystery Multiplier of my observations and experiences--let's assume that the contractor placement process is incredibly efficient all across iraq, and call it "5", for a total of only 15 mis-utilized/overpaid contractors across the country (Stop laughing, we'll get to that in my next point)--and we end up with a total utter wastage of a cool 3 Million Bucks.

At this point, I anticipate several objections.
1) "So what?  3mil is peanuts compared with the overall cost of the war."

Yes, and it's still $3 mil, which is enough to do a whole lot of other things in this country.  Like the man said, a million here, a million there, and soon you're talking real money.  But this attitude is commonplace.  There is almost no incentive for fiscal discipline for the service at war.  Expenditures are all based on a budget and pots of money from various places, and while those are drying up (In Iraq), you'd be surprised how adept at finagling money the military is.  The usual justification is "Oh, it's for the troops!" which can be very valid, but let's face it-- if we spent more time figuring out what we needed and where to cut money from useless crap (or at least get the value from the money we've spent), then we'd be a lot more cost effective.

This is not an isolated incident.  The amount of money that the Army wastes by having the wrong people in the wrong places is amazing.  Soldiers, contractors, it doesn't matter:  Somewhere, somehow, your dollars are being spent to pay someone in Frictional Employment.  Don't blame the soldier: blame the system.  

We don't want to skimp to defeat, but right now there's a lot of things to do and we don't need to be paying for mid-eastern vacations for people.  If you're going to deploy me, use me.  Which brings me to my next point:

2) "It can't be avoided, we just have to live with it."

You're absolutely right.  There's no way that the Army can avoid wasting money on things.  But somehow, companies across America learn to do it every day.  I am not sure what the solution is, except for possibly introducing financial discipline as a criterion pursuant to my first few posts.  We needs a total overhaul in accountability and justification, which is something that soldiers aren't good at when it comes to money.  The generals have a completely different idea of spending priorities than do the field-grades, and the staff thinks that the operations folks are totally off base, and so forth.  It's a giant cluster.  But there's a lot of money to go around, everybody takes their piece, and everybody's happy... but the efficiency rates aren't so hot.

For another instance, the ACU/ Multi-Cam fiasco is just winding up.  After 5 years of fielding the Generals' Favorite Uniform Evar (the ACU), the Army has decided to listen to the soldiers and 1) get rid of that silly-ass ACU digital pattern, and 2) go back to buttons instead of velcro on the pockets.  They are going to switch uniforms for troops in Afghanistan to the Multi-Cam pattern.

Did we really need to purchase 5 years' worth of crap uniforms with all the associated generals doing studies and convening task-forces/working groups, etc., to take care of something that your average infantry Joe could have made a better decision on in five minutes?  Apparently, the answer is Yes.

I won't even delve into the opportunity costs that all this has incurred.

Say it with me: Fraud, Waste, and Abuse.

Everything I've said is all anecdotal, which I admit is not quantifiable.  But you have to have blinders on to think that the government can spend money responsibly, even in the context of a war.  

What can we do about all this?

I am not sure, but it probably has to do with:
1) Figuring out what we need, preferably ahead of when we need it
2) Figuring out how much of what it is that we need
3) Buying it
4) Looking for ways to be efficient

These apply to materiel and personnel.

Army culture, history, and incentives militate against every one of these steps.  I don't know how to change those things, other than what I've already written.

Projection

All right.  Let's play a game.  Suppose, for instance, that you are a consultant.

Then suppose, contrary to all of your previous knowledge about how consulting is supposed to work, you pay your client for the privilege of advising him, instead of him paying you for your expertise.

Now suppose that your client only occasionally wants to take your advice, and only puts up with you being around to advise him because you are paying him.

This is what is going on in Iraq right now.  It is of course a gross oversimplification of the whole situation, but several essential elements remain:

1) We are training and equipping Iraq's government.  This is not limited to just training the army, but encompasses advising on all aspects of the functioning government.
2) The Government of Iraq doesn't have to do anything that we tell them to.  Since the July 30, 2009 security agreement, the Iraqis have been running their own country.  Certainly, there are bumps along the way, but they are doing it.
3) The US has a purely advisory role.  Every operation we do is partnered; most aspects of interaction with the GoI are focused on increasing capacity and streamlining systems.

There's a saying that's frequently bandied about on the US side of the house-- "An Iraqi [or Arab] solution for an Iraqi [again, or Arab] problem", coming from some saying from TE Lawrence, aka Lawrence of Arabia.  It's meant to be a reminder that the US cannot expect that US solutions to Iraqi problems will work.  There are too many competing local tribal, sectarian, and political issues in the mix for the US to impose solutions to many of what we perceive as problems.

Unfortunately, Iraq has become a staging ground for a whole host of commands, each bent on "doing something!" to look good, expand individual fiefdoms, or otherwise get promoted.  The practical effect of this is that whenever the GoI is not handling something like the US thinks it should, there's a whole flurry of activity--research, briefings, more briefings, and some meetings--to conclude what this junior SM could have told you up front-- that the Iraqis will do what they damn well please, when they want it, and unless they want to do it, then USF ain't doin' squat.  But unless those briefings happen, then higher-ups can't pretend to make decisions that mainly involve playing at diplomat and doing KLEs (that's Key Leader Engagement, for the uninitiated) in the hope of getting a recalcitrant partner to do something we want him to do.

And yet we continue to spin our wheels and panic when the Iraqis don't do what we want.  At the same time, USF frequently completely disregard the Iraqis' motivations or wants.  In a recent meeting, Your Intrepid Blogger noted a particular instance about training priorities:

Person A:  Are these American Training priorities, or have the Iraqis had input into this?

*cricket*

Let the record show that the training priority had something to do with MILES., which is an American training system and is about the second-to-last thing that Iraq needs right now, right before snowplows for Basrah.  But it's not just about equipment or training.  This projection extends to everything the US does-- we desperately want to influence or push the Iraqis to do things, but can't stand to see them taking care of business on their own and at their own pace.

It's a shame.  We want the US solution to the Iraqi problem.  An Iraqi solution might work, but it wouldn't look as good on an OER, that's for sure.  I can't help but get the feeling (and admittedly, I am removed from a lot of the action, being on staff and all) that we are simply cannon fodder for officers to pad their joint billet time in an only mildly threatening theater where there is minimal risk of failure.  I am sure the Iraqis love having Americans over to tell them what to do.  At this point, we're just a checkbook, and they'll pass on the partnership, thanks very much.