We're still in Afghanistan. Stan McChrystal has been relieved because of an ostensibly unintentionally offensive (to the People's Administration) Rolling Stone Article. Gen. Dave Petraeus has taken over / been put in charge. We've implemented a temporary surge, at least until 2011... or until military prudence dictates, depending on who you listen to, and when.
So what exactly are we doing in Afghanistan? If you listen to popular wisdom, we're in it to either a) improve US national security or b) build a peaceful, stable Afghanistan by improving their armed forces and government.
Here's my take. We did Objective A a while ago, when we ousted the Taliban with our horse-soldiers. We've been dilly-dallying around for the past 9 years. We have achieved little concrete progress on Objective B.
A little background: Afghanistan is comprised of a variety of peoples and cultures in a Biblical landscape that has historically been ungovernable for any length of time over the majority of the country. Ask the British, Indians, Pakistanis, Russians, or the Afghans themselves. That is, if you can find any who identify themselves as Afghans as opposed to Hazaras, Pashtuns, etc.
So Objective B is a mighty formidable task. We're just getting around to it after dealing with Iraq (which was doing pretty well until they had to do that little transition-of-power thing, just as we're doing our transition-the-hell-out-of-there thing). We have neglected Afghanistan, for a variety of reasons, for most of the past decade. But it's now on the front burner because of an essential need to polish certain foreign-policy credentials.
Let's look at the future and past, past first. We have what economists might call a series of sunk costs in Afghanistan--considerable time, effort, funding, and lives lost in the country. In determining what our future course of action should be, these considerations should be... absolutely 0. Sunk Costs should have no bearing on our future course of action.
I'm going to say that again, because it's important--just like you wouldn't throw good money after bad (because doing so makes good money bad), and like you should learn to fold in poker before losing your chips on a mediocre hand, it's vitally important that we learn that sunk costs have no bearing on our future success. They do have an important psychological effect, but one that most financial psychologists/analysts is detrimental to investing success. Make no mistake about it, we're investing in Afghanistan--but what kind of returns are we trying to get?
So now, the Future. What SHOULD have bearing on our future course of action is this question: Does staying in Afghanistan to build a nation improve our own national well-being? That is the ONLY question we should be asking, and it's the only basis that we should be evaluating our strategy on.
Here are considerations in answering that question:
Question: Does a stable, secure Afghanistan, in fact, improve our national security significantly past where we already are? Does it warrant staying versus just going back to kick Taliban butt if they re-organize later? I think the answer is no, personally--we could achieve some great results leaving a few A-team advisors in country with Dept of State doing its liaison/advisory thing. One argument for staying is that we need to prevent the resurgence of Al-Qaeda. I don't buy it. For one thing, Al-Qaeda is a global organization, hardly based in Afghanistan. We'd be better off focusing on the problem of Iran, or Pakistan, or... well, pick your poison. Afghanistan is not the key to combating Islamic extremism.
Question 2: What is our end-state? Afghanistan is centuries behind Iraq. Most of the country is still working through the 10th century. Do we want to make it look like France? I don't think we can. I think Anne Coulter and Mike Steele may have a point. I think Afghanistan is worth getting out of, yesterday. We are not going to make it into a stable, secure state. It is simply not configured for a central government outside of the major urban centers--and even those have historically been trouble spots. I'd be interested to see where we can succeed after everyone else has decided to give up on it, but I feel that we're throwing good money, lives, and time after bad at this point.
The only argument that I see holding water for staying in the country is this--that the US may suffer a blow to its reputation or credibility on foreign affairs. That's a legitimate concern. I also figure it'll make a good weekend assignment to the diplomatic corps to craft an intelligent statement that shows that we're not idiots, and we know to quit when our goals have in fact been achieved. It can be done in a thoughtful, deliberate way that doesn't signal weakness or stupidity to the Chinese and Iranians.
But in the meantime, let's marshal our resources and will to use where they matter--and that isn't in Afghanistan.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Sexual equality and the Army PT Test
Many reasonable people will agree that if Group A only has to score one-quarter as well on an ability test as Group B to be considered equally capable to Group B, then you've got preferences occurring. If you mixed gender or race into this--if you had a school that admitted black students with 1/4 the GPA that it required white students to have--you'd note accurately that you were observing a case of discrimination, or affirmative action--however you want to term it.
The question is what circumstances warrant having differing standards for different groups based on arbitrary judgments about the value of those groups.
Ideally, those circumstances are not outcome or performance based. We don't want to introduce those arbitrary judgments into situations where there is a real, objective, measurable outcome based on the ability of the groups. Handicapping or helping certain groups would distort the outcome of the sorting mechanism--the ability test would no longer be a valid indicator of ability. The overall outcome would be a reduced overall capability for the aggregate group.
This is exactly what is happening in the Army with its sex-divided Physical Training (PT) standards. The Army Physical Fitness Test consists of 3 events: Pushups, situps, and a 2-mile run. Each of these events is graded by number of repetitions, and is scaled for age and sex. The minimum passing score for each event is 60 points, and the maximum is 100 points.
For instance: A 19-year-old female soldier who completes 19 pushups scores 60 points. If she completes 42 pushups, she scores 100 points. A 19-year-old male soldier has to do 42 pushups for his 60 points, and maxes out at 71 repetitions. For situps, the male/female scales are equal. For the run, the scale is again unequal. The male passes his run at a time of 15:54, and the female passes at 18:54. The max score times are 13:00 and 15:36, respectively.
That makes sense, right? Males are typically larger, stronger, and faster than females. The score distributions and scales were based on testing many, many people to develop reasonable expectations of fitness. Therefore, the scales should account for physiological differences between males and females.
There's only one problem with this. Men and women are both in the Army. The Army occasionally requires its members to do things like be in combat, or perform various physically difficult tasks. Men and women are both permitted in many of the same jobs, and are likely to end up doing very similar things throughout their careers. The 115-lb woman who can do 42 pushups may be in the same position as a 200-lb man who can do 71. A PT test scaled for sex nicely captures the difference between male and female capabilities, but does nothing to answer the important question: What is the minimum standard of physical fitness for a soldier?
This is particularly pertinent because physical fitness scores are noted on performance evaluations, and can be cause to get someone kicked out of the Army. A male who can bench 300 lbs may be at risk for being chaptered out for being a slow runner, but the 95-lb female who can run but can't lift a 40-lb box will stay in. Or vice versa. You get the picture.
By allowing women to have lower physical standards, the Army is doing a couple things wrong. It is acknowledging either that A) it is putting physically unqualified women into positions where they are likely to fail, or B) the requirements that it imposes on men are far too high for what the job requirements actually are. This approach also engenders resentment on the part of men, and a feeling of inferiority on the part of women. It is similar to affirmative action in this regard.
I suggest this fix: Align physical fitness standards to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). If Infantrymen need to meet higher physical standards--and they do--than, say, intel weenies, then it's unfair to the infantrymen and the intel weenies. The Intel weenies don't need to have a high PT standard. The Infantrymen do. The force would benefit by having higher official PT standards for its infantrymen, and lower standards for its intel analysts, who probably don't need to be training on push-ups anyway. It would get and retain more analysts, both male and female. Having an aggregate PT standard for each sex imposes unnecessary requirements and restrictions on each of the MOS's, which do radically different jobs.
Additionally, this division by MOS would solve the very important problem of differing standards of physical fitness for men and women. A MOS-specific PT test, with the same standards for men and women, would clearly show what the minimum standard is. It would not grant a free pass to anyone. It would not penalize anyone. It would simply say that to be a generator repair mechanic, you have to be able to do X pushups and X situps and haul your butt around a 2-mile course in X time.
This would be a very good solution to matching qualified personnel to job positions, and it would eliminate the male-female PT standard divide. It would end the perception that women can't hack the Army that men have to. It would better separate who is suited for what job. For an organization as proud of proclaiming its reliance and adherence on standards, the Army has hopelessly bolo'ed this matter for decades, and this is an easy fix.
The question is what circumstances warrant having differing standards for different groups based on arbitrary judgments about the value of those groups.
Ideally, those circumstances are not outcome or performance based. We don't want to introduce those arbitrary judgments into situations where there is a real, objective, measurable outcome based on the ability of the groups. Handicapping or helping certain groups would distort the outcome of the sorting mechanism--the ability test would no longer be a valid indicator of ability. The overall outcome would be a reduced overall capability for the aggregate group.
This is exactly what is happening in the Army with its sex-divided Physical Training (PT) standards. The Army Physical Fitness Test consists of 3 events: Pushups, situps, and a 2-mile run. Each of these events is graded by number of repetitions, and is scaled for age and sex. The minimum passing score for each event is 60 points, and the maximum is 100 points.
For instance: A 19-year-old female soldier who completes 19 pushups scores 60 points. If she completes 42 pushups, she scores 100 points. A 19-year-old male soldier has to do 42 pushups for his 60 points, and maxes out at 71 repetitions. For situps, the male/female scales are equal. For the run, the scale is again unequal. The male passes his run at a time of 15:54, and the female passes at 18:54. The max score times are 13:00 and 15:36, respectively.
That makes sense, right? Males are typically larger, stronger, and faster than females. The score distributions and scales were based on testing many, many people to develop reasonable expectations of fitness. Therefore, the scales should account for physiological differences between males and females.
There's only one problem with this. Men and women are both in the Army. The Army occasionally requires its members to do things like be in combat, or perform various physically difficult tasks. Men and women are both permitted in many of the same jobs, and are likely to end up doing very similar things throughout their careers. The 115-lb woman who can do 42 pushups may be in the same position as a 200-lb man who can do 71. A PT test scaled for sex nicely captures the difference between male and female capabilities, but does nothing to answer the important question: What is the minimum standard of physical fitness for a soldier?
This is particularly pertinent because physical fitness scores are noted on performance evaluations, and can be cause to get someone kicked out of the Army. A male who can bench 300 lbs may be at risk for being chaptered out for being a slow runner, but the 95-lb female who can run but can't lift a 40-lb box will stay in. Or vice versa. You get the picture.
By allowing women to have lower physical standards, the Army is doing a couple things wrong. It is acknowledging either that A) it is putting physically unqualified women into positions where they are likely to fail, or B) the requirements that it imposes on men are far too high for what the job requirements actually are. This approach also engenders resentment on the part of men, and a feeling of inferiority on the part of women. It is similar to affirmative action in this regard.
I suggest this fix: Align physical fitness standards to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). If Infantrymen need to meet higher physical standards--and they do--than, say, intel weenies, then it's unfair to the infantrymen and the intel weenies. The Intel weenies don't need to have a high PT standard. The Infantrymen do. The force would benefit by having higher official PT standards for its infantrymen, and lower standards for its intel analysts, who probably don't need to be training on push-ups anyway. It would get and retain more analysts, both male and female. Having an aggregate PT standard for each sex imposes unnecessary requirements and restrictions on each of the MOS's, which do radically different jobs.
Additionally, this division by MOS would solve the very important problem of differing standards of physical fitness for men and women. A MOS-specific PT test, with the same standards for men and women, would clearly show what the minimum standard is. It would not grant a free pass to anyone. It would not penalize anyone. It would simply say that to be a generator repair mechanic, you have to be able to do X pushups and X situps and haul your butt around a 2-mile course in X time.
This would be a very good solution to matching qualified personnel to job positions, and it would eliminate the male-female PT standard divide. It would end the perception that women can't hack the Army that men have to. It would better separate who is suited for what job. For an organization as proud of proclaiming its reliance and adherence on standards, the Army has hopelessly bolo'ed this matter for decades, and this is an easy fix.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Judging B-School Admissions Chances
I'm thinking of applying to a couple of name-brand business schools that I'm competitive for.
I assess that I'm competitive because my scores are well within the range of the schools' class profiles. However, what would really help me out in assessing my chances would be knowing the characteristics of the applicant pool. I am particularly interested in correlation of GMAT scores with admit rates.
For instance, say School A has an applicant pool of 10000, and admits 1000. The admit rate is 10%. Then the school comes out and says its admit profile has a middle 50% GMAT range of (for instance) 690-750. This is wonderful, and with the 80% spread can give a pretty good picture of what the normalized curve for the entering class looks like. But that tells me nothing about my chances before I get in; it merely says how I'll fit in once I get there.
If I had the applicant pool profile, then I could match up the normal curve of the applicant pool with that of the admit pool--overlay them, almost-- and see if the left end of the Applicant GMAT curve significantly overlaps the left end of the Admit GMAT curve significantly enough to rule out most of the low-end of the applicant pool.
Note that schools do not release profiles of their applicant pools. This must be to increase the number of people applying by preventing people from seeing that they don't have a very good chance of getting in. They can claim to be a) not basing admissions on test scores, and b) getting lots of applicants to get their admit ratios low and keep exclusivity up. In other words, they are having their cake and eating it too.
I assess that the 10% admit rate in the example is actually closer to 40%, maybe 50%, of qualified candidates, i.e. those that match the general class profile. Now, to be truthful, I do not have any statistics to back that up, other than to say that the mean GMAT score nationwide is around 530, and that a lot of people apply to exclusive schools just because they are exclusive. Assuming that 2/3 of the GMAT test-takers do actually get scores between 400 and 600, as the test is designed, and standard deviation is about 100 points... well, I would be very interested to see the applicant pool stats vs admit pool stats. I think we'd be very surprised what the admit rate is for people who fit the class admit pool.
While the applicant pool is probably skewed high based on the caliber of school, I don't think that solely geniuses are all applying to Harvard. Why? There aren't enough of them for the top-20 schools. See the next bit..
Now, I could be totally off base and all the normal people could be scared off by the high mean GMAT of the schools. However, this doesn't pass the sniff test. If I'm average Joe, I might not apply to the exclusive school... but the cost of the application (in time and money) might be worth the return, especially because I know the school admits at least a few low-end scores. Might be my lucky day, or something.
What we do know then is that a lot of folks apply to multiple schools, and we have a lot of lower-tier GMAT applicants as well. We also know that top schools admit mostly top GMAT performers.
Keep in mind that the GMAT takers number includes International students as well, which are taking the GMAT in equal or greater numbers to US takers. What I am leaving out of my analysis is the folks who have legacy GMAT scores (like who keep scores on file for a couple of years and then apply) because 1) not all of the top GMAT takers apply to the exclusive schools, 2) not all GMAT takers apply to schools period, and 3) it's a rolling process, so I assume that the carry-overs from last year replace the ones who wait this year.
So what is the takeaway? If you're applying to a top B-School or other school that requires the GMAT, and you're facing great odds... like the 10000 apps vs 1000 slots crunch... and you have a high GMAT, you probably don't have to worry about quite as much as you thought you did. And you can still tell people you got into a really selective school.
If you had an average GMAT, then you need to be really really special, because you're competing with the high scores that comprise the majority of slots, and the low-scores are relatively rare at the selective schools.
I still want to see the applicant pool profile. But I suspect we never will, because it would mean too much in prestige and applications revenue.
Feedback and help with my math would be greatly appreciated.
I assess that I'm competitive because my scores are well within the range of the schools' class profiles. However, what would really help me out in assessing my chances would be knowing the characteristics of the applicant pool. I am particularly interested in correlation of GMAT scores with admit rates.
For instance, say School A has an applicant pool of 10000, and admits 1000. The admit rate is 10%. Then the school comes out and says its admit profile has a middle 50% GMAT range of (for instance) 690-750. This is wonderful, and with the 80% spread can give a pretty good picture of what the normalized curve for the entering class looks like. But that tells me nothing about my chances before I get in; it merely says how I'll fit in once I get there.
If I had the applicant pool profile, then I could match up the normal curve of the applicant pool with that of the admit pool--overlay them, almost-- and see if the left end of the Applicant GMAT curve significantly overlaps the left end of the Admit GMAT curve significantly enough to rule out most of the low-end of the applicant pool.
Note that schools do not release profiles of their applicant pools. This must be to increase the number of people applying by preventing people from seeing that they don't have a very good chance of getting in. They can claim to be a) not basing admissions on test scores, and b) getting lots of applicants to get their admit ratios low and keep exclusivity up. In other words, they are having their cake and eating it too.
I assess that the 10% admit rate in the example is actually closer to 40%, maybe 50%, of qualified candidates, i.e. those that match the general class profile. Now, to be truthful, I do not have any statistics to back that up, other than to say that the mean GMAT score nationwide is around 530, and that a lot of people apply to exclusive schools just because they are exclusive. Assuming that 2/3 of the GMAT test-takers do actually get scores between 400 and 600, as the test is designed, and standard deviation is about 100 points... well, I would be very interested to see the applicant pool stats vs admit pool stats. I think we'd be very surprised what the admit rate is for people who fit the class admit pool.
While the applicant pool is probably skewed high based on the caliber of school, I don't think that solely geniuses are all applying to Harvard. Why? There aren't enough of them for the top-20 schools. See the next bit..
The applicant pool we're interested in are about 2 standard deviations above the mean--actually, with a 690 and above, we're talking about 1.5 STDEVs above, or in roughly the 94th percentile. The number of GMAT test-takers last year was 267000. We'll assume all single, unique testers for this little exercise.
With a total pool of 267000 GMAT test takers, we look at what a score of 690 means percentage-wise (set the mean to 538 and stdev to 100, then move the cursor to 690), multiply by the total GMAT population, and end up with a total of... 16000 people with a minimum 690 GMAT score. With a 730 GMAT, it becomes 8000 people. Are all those people applying to the same schools? There may be some overlap, but let's posit that that all the smart people (690 GMAT and above) apply to the top 10 schools. With average class sizes being about 560, we're talking a total of 5600 top-program slots available. Assuming that only this year's GMAT takers apply, this means that if everybody with a 690 or above--throughout the world--applied to these top 10 B-schools, we'd see a 30% admit rate.
This isn't even counting the next 10 ranked b-schools, or other top-ranked international schools, etc. Wow, the odds just get better and better for scores in that top 6%, don't they? This tells me that there are a lot of people applying with sub-super GMAT scores, and that those people comprise the majority of the exclusive schools' rejects.
This isn't even counting the next 10 ranked b-schools, or other top-ranked international schools, etc. Wow, the odds just get better and better for scores in that top 6%, don't they? This tells me that there are a lot of people applying with sub-super GMAT scores, and that those people comprise the majority of the exclusive schools' rejects.
Now, I could be totally off base and all the normal people could be scared off by the high mean GMAT of the schools. However, this doesn't pass the sniff test. If I'm average Joe, I might not apply to the exclusive school... but the cost of the application (in time and money) might be worth the return, especially because I know the school admits at least a few low-end scores. Might be my lucky day, or something.
What we do know then is that a lot of folks apply to multiple schools, and we have a lot of lower-tier GMAT applicants as well. We also know that top schools admit mostly top GMAT performers.
Keep in mind that the GMAT takers number includes International students as well, which are taking the GMAT in equal or greater numbers to US takers. What I am leaving out of my analysis is the folks who have legacy GMAT scores (like who keep scores on file for a couple of years and then apply) because 1) not all of the top GMAT takers apply to the exclusive schools, 2) not all GMAT takers apply to schools period, and 3) it's a rolling process, so I assume that the carry-overs from last year replace the ones who wait this year.
So what is the takeaway? If you're applying to a top B-School or other school that requires the GMAT, and you're facing great odds... like the 10000 apps vs 1000 slots crunch... and you have a high GMAT, you probably don't have to worry about quite as much as you thought you did. And you can still tell people you got into a really selective school.
If you had an average GMAT, then you need to be really really special, because you're competing with the high scores that comprise the majority of slots, and the low-scores are relatively rare at the selective schools.
I still want to see the applicant pool profile. But I suspect we never will, because it would mean too much in prestige and applications revenue.
Feedback and help with my math would be greatly appreciated.
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Union Theory
This will be a short post, as I am not an economist and haven't done any research on the post-topic. Also, my jargon will be off because I haven't taken econ in years.
Here it is.
Thesis: Adding constraints or invalidating economic assumptions creates market distortions.
No suprise there, right?
Sub-Thesis: Labor unions are an externality caused by the invalidation of the homo economicus assumption of perfect mobility.
Explanation: When I learned about labor markets in Econ 101, I learned that labor is a commodity (more or less) with its supply and demand curves, et cetera. One of the things that had to be accounted for in assessing prices and elasticity and so forth was the degree of mobility of the labor in question. Now, it seems that unions were created because workers weren't getting paid commensurate with their working conditions and labor. The only reason this could have happened is that there were no other acceptable jobs around, and that the workers couldn't move to the jobs they wanted.
Whether those jobs actually existed is irrelevant to this point.
Now, as the workers couldn't move to a better job, there was a market distortion that benefited the employers, namely a lack of competition for labor. The employers essentially had a captive labor pool and could pay less than competitive-market prices. So, as the unions formed, they essentially functioned as a substitute for the perfect mobility that the workers lacked. They acted as an indirect competitor with the original employer. This moved the overall supply/demand curve intersection to a point closer to that of optimal efficiency.
This suggests that there is an economically optimal amount of union involvement in a given labor pool or situation. That amount would be just enough to balance the degree of invalidation in the labor-supply-assumption, or perfect mobility, whatever you want to call it. Further, if there's an optimal amount of union involvement, that means that there are sub-optimal levels-- too high, and too low--and those levels can be determined and compared against reality.
This is a fun academic exercise. I think it describes why unions formed and a bit of their history. For predictive theory, it seems that unions would thrive in environments where the facilities are fixed and labor pools are specialized (hence, they have imperfect mobility) and be unable to keep a foothold where labor is fungible and facilities are widely distributed (or where mobility is greater). Does this accurately describe reality?
It does not describe union pension plans, however-- I think that will take a more deliberate thought-experiment to explain.
Here it is.
Thesis: Adding constraints or invalidating economic assumptions creates market distortions.
No suprise there, right?
Sub-Thesis: Labor unions are an externality caused by the invalidation of the homo economicus assumption of perfect mobility.
Explanation: When I learned about labor markets in Econ 101, I learned that labor is a commodity (more or less) with its supply and demand curves, et cetera. One of the things that had to be accounted for in assessing prices and elasticity and so forth was the degree of mobility of the labor in question. Now, it seems that unions were created because workers weren't getting paid commensurate with their working conditions and labor. The only reason this could have happened is that there were no other acceptable jobs around, and that the workers couldn't move to the jobs they wanted.
Whether those jobs actually existed is irrelevant to this point.
Now, as the workers couldn't move to a better job, there was a market distortion that benefited the employers, namely a lack of competition for labor. The employers essentially had a captive labor pool and could pay less than competitive-market prices. So, as the unions formed, they essentially functioned as a substitute for the perfect mobility that the workers lacked. They acted as an indirect competitor with the original employer. This moved the overall supply/demand curve intersection to a point closer to that of optimal efficiency.
This suggests that there is an economically optimal amount of union involvement in a given labor pool or situation. That amount would be just enough to balance the degree of invalidation in the labor-supply-assumption, or perfect mobility, whatever you want to call it. Further, if there's an optimal amount of union involvement, that means that there are sub-optimal levels-- too high, and too low--and those levels can be determined and compared against reality.
This is a fun academic exercise. I think it describes why unions formed and a bit of their history. For predictive theory, it seems that unions would thrive in environments where the facilities are fixed and labor pools are specialized (hence, they have imperfect mobility) and be unable to keep a foothold where labor is fungible and facilities are widely distributed (or where mobility is greater). Does this accurately describe reality?
It does not describe union pension plans, however-- I think that will take a more deliberate thought-experiment to explain.
Baghdad Election Booms
This evening I heard small-arms fire (like AK-47s) and explosions (probably RPGs) in the distance as I walked to my CHU. Over the last several days, we've seen embassy bombings and a massacre. It seems as though there is mischief afoot.
Personally, I am glad this is happening now. Here's why: We are still here. I would wager that the recent spate of violence is directly related to the recent elections and the Iraqi people's empowerment of Ahmed Allawi. This did two things. First, it emboldened Al-Qaeda, which now have another Sunni (and former ba'athist) on the cusp of power. I don't think Allawi is a bad guy, as he pissed off Saddam pretty good, but he is likely tied through family and tribal relations to some bad people. Additionally, as he takes over the PM slot, he will inevitably replace current officials with those he prefers-- and those officials are more likely to be tied to Sunni extremist groups than the current officials. This all adds up to a political climate that might embolden Sunni groups, and I think that's what we're seeing now.
Now, the other side of the coin has the Shi'a contingent (like Nouri Al-Maliki and his contingent) not wanting to relinquish power to the newly-elected government. So there will be shenanigans from the Shi'a side of the house and its Iranian supporters as Maliki tries to create either a) a reason for him to stay in power, or b) um... another reason for him to stay in power.
This is why I am glad this is happening now. If Maliki had won, we would probably not be seeing the recent increase in violence. The long-term effect, however, would be that Iraq would have to go through its first eventual transfer of power on its own and later. Historically, transfers of power have been a hard thing for middle-eastern countries to deal with. See: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc. So for Iraq to confront this election and transfer of power now, when the US is still around to provide a stabilizing influence, is a very good thing over the long term.
There's nothing saying that the political situation won't vaporize when Allawi gets voted out of office in 4 years, but it's a lot more likely to go smoothly if we establish a positive precedent now. The confidence of the people in the process will go a long way to making this a permanent fixture. Then, in 20 years, we can look at this moment, right now, and say it was a defining point in Iraq's prosperity.
Personally, I am glad this is happening now. Here's why: We are still here. I would wager that the recent spate of violence is directly related to the recent elections and the Iraqi people's empowerment of Ahmed Allawi. This did two things. First, it emboldened Al-Qaeda, which now have another Sunni (and former ba'athist) on the cusp of power. I don't think Allawi is a bad guy, as he pissed off Saddam pretty good, but he is likely tied through family and tribal relations to some bad people. Additionally, as he takes over the PM slot, he will inevitably replace current officials with those he prefers-- and those officials are more likely to be tied to Sunni extremist groups than the current officials. This all adds up to a political climate that might embolden Sunni groups, and I think that's what we're seeing now.
Now, the other side of the coin has the Shi'a contingent (like Nouri Al-Maliki and his contingent) not wanting to relinquish power to the newly-elected government. So there will be shenanigans from the Shi'a side of the house and its Iranian supporters as Maliki tries to create either a) a reason for him to stay in power, or b) um... another reason for him to stay in power.
This is why I am glad this is happening now. If Maliki had won, we would probably not be seeing the recent increase in violence. The long-term effect, however, would be that Iraq would have to go through its first eventual transfer of power on its own and later. Historically, transfers of power have been a hard thing for middle-eastern countries to deal with. See: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc. So for Iraq to confront this election and transfer of power now, when the US is still around to provide a stabilizing influence, is a very good thing over the long term.
There's nothing saying that the political situation won't vaporize when Allawi gets voted out of office in 4 years, but it's a lot more likely to go smoothly if we establish a positive precedent now. The confidence of the people in the process will go a long way to making this a permanent fixture. Then, in 20 years, we can look at this moment, right now, and say it was a defining point in Iraq's prosperity.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Surefire controversy!
Let's talk Don't Ask, Don't Tell a bit. I have served in all-male light infantry and motorized line infantry units, co-ed training units, and co-ed staff units. I went to the Military Academy, which is a co-ed institution with approximately 17% of the student body being female. My experience is wide enough that I have a fairly good idea of what goes on in the Army and can therefore comment on some impacts of the policy popularly known as Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT).
First, let's posit a few things.
1. Any policy affecting or regulating the military ought to be crafted with the explicit aim of enhancing the capability of the armed forces. I hope this is apparent. If you disagree with me on this, then stop reading and go do something else.
2. Military capability is a function of the total equipment, personnel, and leadership/organizational activity of the military. It means the ability to deliver the right force to the right target in the right place at the right time.
3. There are trade-offs inherent in every policy. To make an analogy, a pawn may move two spaces forward, which is an advance, but the trade-off is that it loses control of the squares it has passed.
Ok, great. Now we are on the same page. So let's address some points about DADT.
The first is a pretty big one that most people seem to miss. DADT does NOT PREVENT gays from serving in the military.
Let me say that again because it is an important point.
DADT does NOT PREVENT gays from serving in the military.
What it prevents is gays from OPENLY serving in the military. What does that mean? That means engaging openly in gay behavior. The line is a little ambiguous, but public displays of affection such as kissing, or getting caught in flagrante are sufficient to open an investigation into the behavior.
But nothing in the policy prevents gay servicemembers from serving, provided they do not publish their orientation to the world to see. And that's the rub. There could be a couple of infantrymen, gay as can be, serving in a line unit, and, for example, living in their own off-post house, doing whatever they wanted to do. And there's nothing the Army could do about it. All that would be required is that they not make out in the barracks in front of their soldiers.
So, you say, the policy is still discriminatory. Well, yes, yes it is. But let's go back to our propositions: Looking at #1, would repealing DADT enhance military capability? I don't think so, and here's why.
1) Gays are already allowed to serve in the military; those who want to can, and therefore the military is not losing a valuable source of manpower. The best (and only, as far as I am concerned) arguments for allowing blacks, women, and etc into the army and integrated units concern the usage of the whole population of the US in military endeavors.
Fairness, taking into account peoples' desire to serve, etc., should have nothing to do with whether they are allowed to serve. To make the point: If a paraplegic wants to serve in the infantry, do we let him? If he is a superior strategic genius, then maybe he should be made a general. However, he is incapable of doing common Infantry tasks. Women (~50% of the population) and minorities (~30% of the population) give valuable contributions to the military, and so the integration effort was well-aimed and well-implemented, despite the negative effects that we do see in co-ed units from a high-percentage male population interacting with a low-percentage female population, especially given the framework of the rank system. There is no such argument for repealing DADT, because gays (2-3% of the population) are already allowed in the military. Repealing DADT would be an exercise in enhancing gay self-esteem, not military readiness. Consequently, the negative effects that we can anticipate--to unit readiness and morale-- are NOT outweighed by the benefits.
Because it would not be a beneficial policy, I am forced to conclude that the campaign to repeal DADT is not based so much on "gay rights" as it is on "I'm Gay, Look At Me!" In short, it is about the individual's freedom to do what you want. Freedom is great-- I am a huge fan of it. And I am leaving the military so I can do what I want. There are tradeoffs (see my #3 above) to every decision. The military demands some degree of conformity. If you can't handle it, don't join-- you know what you're getting into when you sign up. However, DADT-repeal proponents would rather force an institution to change for a few individuals' lifestyle preferences than recognize that what they are doing is not in the best interest of the military.
We then have a branch. Would DADT repeal be detrimental to the military? I don't know for sure. I can say that with the coming confluence of gay marriage and military benefits, I would bet a month's paycheck that with those policies in place, most of my all-male infantry platoon would have gotten "married" to be allowed to use off-post housing and get BAH. I can't say that my platoon would be significantly degraded by this, but I think getting my soldiers in formation in the morning would be a lot more difficult, and I would see a lot more legal problems coming out of Animal-House style quarters. I could be wrong, but that's where I would see things going.
I would also guess that living quarters for military service members in general would be dramatically reconfigured. There would no longer be ANY justification for segregating housing by sex.
Read that again, and think about it. It's absolutely correct. What is the justification for segregating housing by sex now? Privacy? Sexual harassment cases? When DADT goes, housing segregation by sex will (logically, but the army doesn't always follow logic) go too. As a result, service-members will have to have each of their own rooms. This is great for the servicemembers and I am all in favor of it generally, but not for the cause celebre of some individuals.
You will notice that I haven't addressed the morale., etc,. of the people in the units. That is intentional. My platoons could probably be assessed as homophobic, but I am not sure how much of that was peer-pressure induced and how much of it was genuinely being bothered by gays. I don't think integrating gays into the units themselves would be a problem unless you had gay romances going on. That is a problem in male-female integrated units as well, and can have a significant detrimental effect on unit readiness. It goes to a lot of fraternization issues. If those could be avoided (which I don't think is entirely realistic) then there wouldn't be a big problem.
However, let me make a point here: forcing people to change their beliefs for the sake of forcing them to change is egotistical and wrong. If there is an injustice going on, fine. But to label a group of people ("the military") as being mentally deficient and requiring them to adjust to accommodate a relative few individuals is not the best use of the military's already poorly-managed time and energy. There are already copious opportunities (mandates) for quarterly and yearly training on suicide, sexual harassment, equal opportunity, and so forth. I got more time in EO classes in my training at Fort Riley than I did training on IVs or calling MEDEVAC. Just sayin'.
Although to be fair I suppose I am at more risk of an EO complaint here on staff than I am of getting blown up. But if I'd gone to Afghanistan, then I'd have a real point.
Are we willing to accept the upheaval that repealing DADT will cause? I personally don't think there's a point to it. We should go with my marriage policy, and DADT in place.
Feedback is welcome, as are additional facts or commentary.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Organizational Ownership Phenomenon
I attended a hail-and-farewell today. For those of you who haven't attended one, it's one of a long list of Army functions that purport to be tradition and morale-building but actually serves to suck up between one and 3 hours of potentially productive time. Last night, for instance, over the course of an hour-and-a-half, we learned exactly who of the incoming and outgoing personnel in the 3 shop were married, and some of what they were going to do once re-deployed. A Colonel sang Irish songs in honor of St. Patrick's Day. Though all this is no doubt crucial to individual self-esteem and a well-deserved recognition after a year of service in Iraq, I can't remember a single person except the specialist who was publicly mocked by the Sergeant Major for being fat and interested in fantasy role-playing games. It was a near-total waste of time, except that I got some chicken wings and was able to assess the male/female ratio on the J3 staff to be approximately 20:1.
However, one productive thing did come out of this event. I came up with yet another reason that the Army is possessed of strong organizational inertia--that is to say, why it doesn't change. The fact that everybody in this Force-level staff changed out in the period of about a month clued me into this: Since the typical tour of duty in the Army is between one and three years, no officer has any incentive to take actions to improve his organization past his individual time-frame.
Hypothesis: Organizational ownership increases with the anticipated tenure of the individual in the organization. Ray Kroc and Sam Walton had tremendous senses of organizational ownership because their lives were tied up in growing their businesses. The typical wal-mart clerk is probably not as enthusiastic. Likewise, Army officers who constantly change units have no incentive to view their role in the Army in light of the long-term good of their immediate organization because they are moving around so much.
Individual officers do not have the capability or incentives to work on anything that will outlast them. Therefore, they focus on short-cycle projects that will produce immediate tangible results. This is where the current deployment-refit-train- cycle (I think it's called something like "Life Cycle Units, or Rotational Readiness program or etc) is very beneficial to the commander. He works through the cycle, declares victory, and goes on to his next assignment. He has no staying power or ability to influence anything in his organization past his RIP/TOA date.
This phenomenon is not strictly limited to officers, but it seems to hit them harder. Within 2 months of my last deployment ending, I'd estimate that 90% of officer-positions changed hands.
So what's the problem? Well, let me make an analogy: Publicly traded businesses are often derided for taking courses of action that benefit their share prices in the short-term without regard for moral hazard or long-term consequences. Just think about the recent banking collapse if you need an example. They are pressured by the public clamor to keep share prices up. This prevents them from taking actions that might be beneficial to the long-term health of the company (i.e. shedding lines of business, layoffs, etc) but are unpopular.
Apply this to the Army. A unit commander (or other officer, but I will say "commander" here to keep it simple) has a short-term goal, just like keeping share prices high: Career advancement, i.e. his OER. After his 2 or 3 years, he moves on to another position in another organization, or a different shop within the same organization-- but more commonly the former. So his incentive is to do whatever he can do NOW, because he is a) rated on his short term performance, and b) he will not be around long enough to see any long-term projects to completion--hence, anything that has a less-than-sexy performance in the immediate term will hurt him. Thus, problems have a tendency to be ignored or put off until the rotation happens, to let the next guy deal with it.
So because officers are moved around so much, they have no incentives to take on long-term unit improvements. They focus on the immediate train-deploy cycle. They focus on their immediate tour and not on how to build the battalion over years.
But, you ask, isn't that a good thing because of cumulative improvement to the unit? Surely new commanders, all full of piss and vinegar, reinvigorate organizations and keep them wired tight.
You'd think so, but then account for the fact that all the expertise and teamwork built up during that time frame is constantly decimated by OTHER officers moving around. The WHOLE ORGANIZATION can change in a period of a couple of months. Because officers are the ones that set the training and operational agenda, every time a command position changes hands, there is a reorientation of priorities throughout the unit. Everyone has to adjust to the new boss. This can happen en-masse--like when the battalion commander and company commanders all change at roughly the same time-- or it can happen piecemeal, with platoon leader rotations, company commander changes, etc. But every time there is a change, the ship has to adjust course. In fact, a time-honored tradition in the Army is assuming authority and declaring that the last guy was all messed up and the situation needs to be fixed. Maybe our current CoC knows something about military culture after all.
The required re-org and re-orientation following personnel turnover simply further reduces the ability of everybody else to make long-term change or adjustments that would improve the organization. Everybody has to drop what they're doing and learn what the new boss wants.
What kind of long-term organizational improvements are we talking about?
How about winning wars? If postings to combat zones were permanent, would we win faster? How about equipment and accountability problems? If officers couldn't kick the can down the road as easily, then they might be able and motivated to take action to fix problems.
By the way, this post nicely supports my idea for a free-market HR department, in which units and individuals work at common interests to find good organizational fits, and then retain the leaders that are worth a damn.
However, one productive thing did come out of this event. I came up with yet another reason that the Army is possessed of strong organizational inertia--that is to say, why it doesn't change. The fact that everybody in this Force-level staff changed out in the period of about a month clued me into this: Since the typical tour of duty in the Army is between one and three years, no officer has any incentive to take actions to improve his organization past his individual time-frame.
Hypothesis: Organizational ownership increases with the anticipated tenure of the individual in the organization. Ray Kroc and Sam Walton had tremendous senses of organizational ownership because their lives were tied up in growing their businesses. The typical wal-mart clerk is probably not as enthusiastic. Likewise, Army officers who constantly change units have no incentive to view their role in the Army in light of the long-term good of their immediate organization because they are moving around so much.
Individual officers do not have the capability or incentives to work on anything that will outlast them. Therefore, they focus on short-cycle projects that will produce immediate tangible results. This is where the current deployment-refit-train- cycle (I think it's called something like "Life Cycle Units, or Rotational Readiness program or etc) is very beneficial to the commander. He works through the cycle, declares victory, and goes on to his next assignment. He has no staying power or ability to influence anything in his organization past his RIP/TOA date.
This phenomenon is not strictly limited to officers, but it seems to hit them harder. Within 2 months of my last deployment ending, I'd estimate that 90% of officer-positions changed hands.
So what's the problem? Well, let me make an analogy: Publicly traded businesses are often derided for taking courses of action that benefit their share prices in the short-term without regard for moral hazard or long-term consequences. Just think about the recent banking collapse if you need an example. They are pressured by the public clamor to keep share prices up. This prevents them from taking actions that might be beneficial to the long-term health of the company (i.e. shedding lines of business, layoffs, etc) but are unpopular.
Apply this to the Army. A unit commander (or other officer, but I will say "commander" here to keep it simple) has a short-term goal, just like keeping share prices high: Career advancement, i.e. his OER. After his 2 or 3 years, he moves on to another position in another organization, or a different shop within the same organization-- but more commonly the former. So his incentive is to do whatever he can do NOW, because he is a) rated on his short term performance, and b) he will not be around long enough to see any long-term projects to completion--hence, anything that has a less-than-sexy performance in the immediate term will hurt him. Thus, problems have a tendency to be ignored or put off until the rotation happens, to let the next guy deal with it.
So because officers are moved around so much, they have no incentives to take on long-term unit improvements. They focus on the immediate train-deploy cycle. They focus on their immediate tour and not on how to build the battalion over years.
But, you ask, isn't that a good thing because of cumulative improvement to the unit? Surely new commanders, all full of piss and vinegar, reinvigorate organizations and keep them wired tight.
You'd think so, but then account for the fact that all the expertise and teamwork built up during that time frame is constantly decimated by OTHER officers moving around. The WHOLE ORGANIZATION can change in a period of a couple of months. Because officers are the ones that set the training and operational agenda, every time a command position changes hands, there is a reorientation of priorities throughout the unit. Everyone has to adjust to the new boss. This can happen en-masse--like when the battalion commander and company commanders all change at roughly the same time-- or it can happen piecemeal, with platoon leader rotations, company commander changes, etc. But every time there is a change, the ship has to adjust course. In fact, a time-honored tradition in the Army is assuming authority and declaring that the last guy was all messed up and the situation needs to be fixed. Maybe our current CoC knows something about military culture after all.
The required re-org and re-orientation following personnel turnover simply further reduces the ability of everybody else to make long-term change or adjustments that would improve the organization. Everybody has to drop what they're doing and learn what the new boss wants.
What kind of long-term organizational improvements are we talking about?
How about winning wars? If postings to combat zones were permanent, would we win faster? How about equipment and accountability problems? If officers couldn't kick the can down the road as easily, then they might be able and motivated to take action to fix problems.
By the way, this post nicely supports my idea for a free-market HR department, in which units and individuals work at common interests to find good organizational fits, and then retain the leaders that are worth a damn.
Monday, March 8, 2010
Fraud, Waste and Abuse, or Your Tax Dollars At Not-Work
Something that a lot of people mistake is frictional unemployment. That's the amount of people in a given economy who are between jobs, and represents the normal exchange or flow of labor between sources of production. It indicates that the market for labor is working. It's really a useful concept, and puts unemployment rates into context. 4% unemployment? That's probably really good, based on the actual can't-find-work percentage. It looks like this:
Can't Find Work = Total Unemployment - Frictional Unemployment
So the Can't Find Work percentage might be actually closer to 1-2% overall. Pretty good, eh? A certain amount of frictional unemployment is actually necessary to having a healthy, functioning free-market economy.
That's not what I'm writing about today. Today's topic is more along the lines of Frictional Employment, a term I'm coining to describe what's happening in my office, and which I will extrapolate to the larger Army and government bureaucracies in general to describe the rampant waste that goes on with the military.
So here's an example. In my staff section, we have several civilian contractors. They are very experienced in their fields. They have spent careers in law enforcement, customs, intel, etc., and are incredible assets in those areas. They are being paid considerable amounts of money to come overseas and ply their expertise to help assist the US or Gov't of Iraq (GoI) learn about governance, law enforcement, etc.
And they are completely useless. They are getting paid essentially to sit around because they have been misplaced in my section. Think about this for a second. These contractors are getting paid in the six-figures (from what I gather) to be here. Their contracting company is getting paid some amount that includes profit as well as additional comp packages for the contractors. So in my shop alone, the US government is spending-- I estimate-- Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (could be more, could be less, but let's call it that for a SWAG, shall we?) to have expertise and experience and sit around and read CNN.
It's not the contractors' fault. They are hard-working individuals. They applied for specific jobs, and were accepted, hired, trained, and sent over here. They have notified their superiors and companies about what's going on. The US forces know what's going on. But they stay in this section. Hence, Frictional Employment is folks being employed where they shouldn't be.
I strongly, strongly suspect based on my time in the office as well as a few other places in this country that this is NOT an isolated occurrence. So let's multiply my figure of $600K by the Mystery Multiplier of my observations and experiences--let's assume that the contractor placement process is incredibly efficient all across iraq, and call it "5", for a total of only 15 mis-utilized/overpaid contractors across the country (Stop laughing, we'll get to that in my next point)--and we end up with a total utter wastage of a cool 3 Million Bucks.
At this point, I anticipate several objections.
1) "So what? 3mil is peanuts compared with the overall cost of the war."
Yes, and it's still $3 mil, which is enough to do a whole lot of other things in this country. Like the man said, a million here, a million there, and soon you're talking real money. But this attitude is commonplace. There is almost no incentive for fiscal discipline for the service at war. Expenditures are all based on a budget and pots of money from various places, and while those are drying up (In Iraq), you'd be surprised how adept at finagling money the military is. The usual justification is "Oh, it's for the troops!" which can be very valid, but let's face it-- if we spent more time figuring out what we needed and where to cut money from useless crap (or at least get the value from the money we've spent), then we'd be a lot more cost effective.
This is not an isolated incident. The amount of money that the Army wastes by having the wrong people in the wrong places is amazing. Soldiers, contractors, it doesn't matter: Somewhere, somehow, your dollars are being spent to pay someone in Frictional Employment. Don't blame the soldier: blame the system.
We don't want to skimp to defeat, but right now there's a lot of things to do and we don't need to be paying for mid-eastern vacations for people. If you're going to deploy me, use me. Which brings me to my next point:
2) "It can't be avoided, we just have to live with it."
You're absolutely right. There's no way that the Army can avoid wasting money on things. But somehow, companies across America learn to do it every day. I am not sure what the solution is, except for possibly introducing financial discipline as a criterion pursuant to my first few posts. We needs a total overhaul in accountability and justification, which is something that soldiers aren't good at when it comes to money. The generals have a completely different idea of spending priorities than do the field-grades, and the staff thinks that the operations folks are totally off base, and so forth. It's a giant cluster. But there's a lot of money to go around, everybody takes their piece, and everybody's happy... but the efficiency rates aren't so hot.
For another instance, the ACU/ Multi-Cam fiasco is just winding up. After 5 years of fielding the Generals' Favorite Uniform Evar (the ACU), the Army has decided to listen to the soldiers and 1) get rid of that silly-ass ACU digital pattern, and 2) go back to buttons instead of velcro on the pockets. They are going to switch uniforms for troops in Afghanistan to the Multi-Cam pattern.
Did we really need to purchase 5 years' worth of crap uniforms with all the associated generals doing studies and convening task-forces/working groups, etc., to take care of something that your average infantry Joe could have made a better decision on in five minutes? Apparently, the answer is Yes.
I won't even delve into the opportunity costs that all this has incurred.
Say it with me: Fraud, Waste, and Abuse.
Everything I've said is all anecdotal, which I admit is not quantifiable. But you have to have blinders on to think that the government can spend money responsibly, even in the context of a war.
What can we do about all this?
I am not sure, but it probably has to do with:
1) Figuring out what we need, preferably ahead of when we need it
2) Figuring out how much of what it is that we need
3) Buying it
4) Looking for ways to be efficient
These apply to materiel and personnel.
Army culture, history, and incentives militate against every one of these steps. I don't know how to change those things, other than what I've already written.
Can't Find Work = Total Unemployment - Frictional Unemployment
So the Can't Find Work percentage might be actually closer to 1-2% overall. Pretty good, eh? A certain amount of frictional unemployment is actually necessary to having a healthy, functioning free-market economy.
That's not what I'm writing about today. Today's topic is more along the lines of Frictional Employment, a term I'm coining to describe what's happening in my office, and which I will extrapolate to the larger Army and government bureaucracies in general to describe the rampant waste that goes on with the military.
So here's an example. In my staff section, we have several civilian contractors. They are very experienced in their fields. They have spent careers in law enforcement, customs, intel, etc., and are incredible assets in those areas. They are being paid considerable amounts of money to come overseas and ply their expertise to help assist the US or Gov't of Iraq (GoI) learn about governance, law enforcement, etc.
And they are completely useless. They are getting paid essentially to sit around because they have been misplaced in my section. Think about this for a second. These contractors are getting paid in the six-figures (from what I gather) to be here. Their contracting company is getting paid some amount that includes profit as well as additional comp packages for the contractors. So in my shop alone, the US government is spending-- I estimate-- Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (could be more, could be less, but let's call it that for a SWAG, shall we?) to have expertise and experience and sit around and read CNN.
It's not the contractors' fault. They are hard-working individuals. They applied for specific jobs, and were accepted, hired, trained, and sent over here. They have notified their superiors and companies about what's going on. The US forces know what's going on. But they stay in this section. Hence, Frictional Employment is folks being employed where they shouldn't be.
I strongly, strongly suspect based on my time in the office as well as a few other places in this country that this is NOT an isolated occurrence. So let's multiply my figure of $600K by the Mystery Multiplier of my observations and experiences--let's assume that the contractor placement process is incredibly efficient all across iraq, and call it "5", for a total of only 15 mis-utilized/overpaid contractors across the country (Stop laughing, we'll get to that in my next point)--and we end up with a total utter wastage of a cool 3 Million Bucks.
At this point, I anticipate several objections.
1) "So what? 3mil is peanuts compared with the overall cost of the war."
Yes, and it's still $3 mil, which is enough to do a whole lot of other things in this country. Like the man said, a million here, a million there, and soon you're talking real money. But this attitude is commonplace. There is almost no incentive for fiscal discipline for the service at war. Expenditures are all based on a budget and pots of money from various places, and while those are drying up (In Iraq), you'd be surprised how adept at finagling money the military is. The usual justification is "Oh, it's for the troops!" which can be very valid, but let's face it-- if we spent more time figuring out what we needed and where to cut money from useless crap (or at least get the value from the money we've spent), then we'd be a lot more cost effective.
This is not an isolated incident. The amount of money that the Army wastes by having the wrong people in the wrong places is amazing. Soldiers, contractors, it doesn't matter: Somewhere, somehow, your dollars are being spent to pay someone in Frictional Employment. Don't blame the soldier: blame the system.
We don't want to skimp to defeat, but right now there's a lot of things to do and we don't need to be paying for mid-eastern vacations for people. If you're going to deploy me, use me. Which brings me to my next point:
2) "It can't be avoided, we just have to live with it."
You're absolutely right. There's no way that the Army can avoid wasting money on things. But somehow, companies across America learn to do it every day. I am not sure what the solution is, except for possibly introducing financial discipline as a criterion pursuant to my first few posts. We needs a total overhaul in accountability and justification, which is something that soldiers aren't good at when it comes to money. The generals have a completely different idea of spending priorities than do the field-grades, and the staff thinks that the operations folks are totally off base, and so forth. It's a giant cluster. But there's a lot of money to go around, everybody takes their piece, and everybody's happy... but the efficiency rates aren't so hot.
For another instance, the ACU/ Multi-Cam fiasco is just winding up. After 5 years of fielding the Generals' Favorite Uniform Evar (the ACU), the Army has decided to listen to the soldiers and 1) get rid of that silly-ass ACU digital pattern, and 2) go back to buttons instead of velcro on the pockets. They are going to switch uniforms for troops in Afghanistan to the Multi-Cam pattern.
Did we really need to purchase 5 years' worth of crap uniforms with all the associated generals doing studies and convening task-forces/working groups, etc., to take care of something that your average infantry Joe could have made a better decision on in five minutes? Apparently, the answer is Yes.
I won't even delve into the opportunity costs that all this has incurred.
Say it with me: Fraud, Waste, and Abuse.
Everything I've said is all anecdotal, which I admit is not quantifiable. But you have to have blinders on to think that the government can spend money responsibly, even in the context of a war.
What can we do about all this?
I am not sure, but it probably has to do with:
1) Figuring out what we need, preferably ahead of when we need it
2) Figuring out how much of what it is that we need
3) Buying it
4) Looking for ways to be efficient
These apply to materiel and personnel.
Army culture, history, and incentives militate against every one of these steps. I don't know how to change those things, other than what I've already written.
Sunday, February 14, 2010
Projection
All right. Let's play a game. Suppose, for instance, that you are a consultant.
Then suppose, contrary to all of your previous knowledge about how consulting is supposed to work, you pay your client for the privilege of advising him, instead of him paying you for your expertise.
Now suppose that your client only occasionally wants to take your advice, and only puts up with you being around to advise him because you are paying him.
This is what is going on in Iraq right now. It is of course a gross oversimplification of the whole situation, but several essential elements remain:
1) We are training and equipping Iraq's government. This is not limited to just training the army, but encompasses advising on all aspects of the functioning government.
2) The Government of Iraq doesn't have to do anything that we tell them to. Since the July 30, 2009 security agreement, the Iraqis have been running their own country. Certainly, there are bumps along the way, but they are doing it.
3) The US has a purely advisory role. Every operation we do is partnered; most aspects of interaction with the GoI are focused on increasing capacity and streamlining systems.
There's a saying that's frequently bandied about on the US side of the house-- "An Iraqi [or Arab] solution for an Iraqi [again, or Arab] problem", coming from some saying from TE Lawrence, aka Lawrence of Arabia. It's meant to be a reminder that the US cannot expect that US solutions to Iraqi problems will work. There are too many competing local tribal, sectarian, and political issues in the mix for the US to impose solutions to many of what we perceive as problems.
Unfortunately, Iraq has become a staging ground for a whole host of commands, each bent on "doing something!" to look good, expand individual fiefdoms, or otherwise get promoted. The practical effect of this is that whenever the GoI is not handling something like the US thinks it should, there's a whole flurry of activity--research, briefings, more briefings, and some meetings--to conclude what this junior SM could have told you up front-- that the Iraqis will do what they damn well please, when they want it, and unless they want to do it, then USF ain't doin' squat. But unless those briefings happen, then higher-ups can't pretend to make decisions that mainly involve playing at diplomat and doing KLEs (that's Key Leader Engagement, for the uninitiated) in the hope of getting a recalcitrant partner to do something we want him to do.
And yet we continue to spin our wheels and panic when the Iraqis don't do what we want. At the same time, USF frequently completely disregard the Iraqis' motivations or wants. In a recent meeting, Your Intrepid Blogger noted a particular instance about training priorities:
Person A: Are these American Training priorities, or have the Iraqis had input into this?
*cricket*
Let the record show that the training priority had something to do with MILES., which is an American training system and is about the second-to-last thing that Iraq needs right now, right before snowplows for Basrah. But it's not just about equipment or training. This projection extends to everything the US does-- we desperately want to influence or push the Iraqis to do things, but can't stand to see them taking care of business on their own and at their own pace.
It's a shame. We want the US solution to the Iraqi problem. An Iraqi solution might work, but it wouldn't look as good on an OER, that's for sure. I can't help but get the feeling (and admittedly, I am removed from a lot of the action, being on staff and all) that we are simply cannon fodder for officers to pad their joint billet time in an only mildly threatening theater where there is minimal risk of failure. I am sure the Iraqis love having Americans over to tell them what to do. At this point, we're just a checkbook, and they'll pass on the partnership, thanks very much.
Then suppose, contrary to all of your previous knowledge about how consulting is supposed to work, you pay your client for the privilege of advising him, instead of him paying you for your expertise.
Now suppose that your client only occasionally wants to take your advice, and only puts up with you being around to advise him because you are paying him.
This is what is going on in Iraq right now. It is of course a gross oversimplification of the whole situation, but several essential elements remain:
1) We are training and equipping Iraq's government. This is not limited to just training the army, but encompasses advising on all aspects of the functioning government.
2) The Government of Iraq doesn't have to do anything that we tell them to. Since the July 30, 2009 security agreement, the Iraqis have been running their own country. Certainly, there are bumps along the way, but they are doing it.
3) The US has a purely advisory role. Every operation we do is partnered; most aspects of interaction with the GoI are focused on increasing capacity and streamlining systems.
There's a saying that's frequently bandied about on the US side of the house-- "An Iraqi [or Arab] solution for an Iraqi [again, or Arab] problem", coming from some saying from TE Lawrence, aka Lawrence of Arabia. It's meant to be a reminder that the US cannot expect that US solutions to Iraqi problems will work. There are too many competing local tribal, sectarian, and political issues in the mix for the US to impose solutions to many of what we perceive as problems.
Unfortunately, Iraq has become a staging ground for a whole host of commands, each bent on "doing something!" to look good, expand individual fiefdoms, or otherwise get promoted. The practical effect of this is that whenever the GoI is not handling something like the US thinks it should, there's a whole flurry of activity--research, briefings, more briefings, and some meetings--to conclude what this junior SM could have told you up front-- that the Iraqis will do what they damn well please, when they want it, and unless they want to do it, then USF ain't doin' squat. But unless those briefings happen, then higher-ups can't pretend to make decisions that mainly involve playing at diplomat and doing KLEs (that's Key Leader Engagement, for the uninitiated) in the hope of getting a recalcitrant partner to do something we want him to do.
And yet we continue to spin our wheels and panic when the Iraqis don't do what we want. At the same time, USF frequently completely disregard the Iraqis' motivations or wants. In a recent meeting, Your Intrepid Blogger noted a particular instance about training priorities:
Person A: Are these American Training priorities, or have the Iraqis had input into this?
*cricket*
Let the record show that the training priority had something to do with MILES., which is an American training system and is about the second-to-last thing that Iraq needs right now, right before snowplows for Basrah. But it's not just about equipment or training. This projection extends to everything the US does-- we desperately want to influence or push the Iraqis to do things, but can't stand to see them taking care of business on their own and at their own pace.
It's a shame. We want the US solution to the Iraqi problem. An Iraqi solution might work, but it wouldn't look as good on an OER, that's for sure. I can't help but get the feeling (and admittedly, I am removed from a lot of the action, being on staff and all) that we are simply cannon fodder for officers to pad their joint billet time in an only mildly threatening theater where there is minimal risk of failure. I am sure the Iraqis love having Americans over to tell them what to do. At this point, we're just a checkbook, and they'll pass on the partnership, thanks very much.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Can't we all get along? Hetero Marriage, Gay Marriage, the State, and You
This post addresses one of the cases for gay marriage and develops some rational solutions to the issue dilemma.
To start with, a little background reading: http://www.newsweek.com/id/229957. This presents a cogent argument for the legal approval of gay marriage. To summarize the author's argument:
1. The state recognizes (heterosexual) marriage as a citizen's right
2. The state ought not deny rights to citizens
3. Gays are citizens, too
4. Therefore, the state ought not deny what it has recognized as a citizen's right (marriage) to a class of citizen
This is a valid argument in its current form. If, after all, marriage is "a relationship recognized by governments as providing a privileged and respected status, entitled to the state's support and benefits", and "It is an expression of our desire to create a social partnership, to live and share life's joys and burdens with the person we love, and to form a lasting bond and a social identity", then what's the fuss about? Surely lawmakers ought, barring electoral, (i.e. employment) considerations, to extend that legal right to our gay brethren without any repercussions. So what's the fuss? Rather, what should we do about the fuss?
The author states that, as noted above, marriage is an expression of a desire to create a "social partnership". He uses the implicit assumption that the government should be able to legitimize and incentivize marriage as a social partnership. Now, in all of this, he barely mentions the impacts of marriage and family on the raising of children, or even the state's interest in sanctioning marriage; he makes his points on equality under the law and social partnerships. Given his framework, he is correct; however, if we look at his view on the purpose of marriage and revise it, then we begin to see other avenues of approach for policy. His legal argument and logic is impeccable, and I have no doubt that his prognostication of the future of gay marriage in the US is accurate. Before that happens though, we ought to re-look at how we got into this argument in the first place.
Let's consider marriage, or more particularly, why marriage exists; then, we can move on to considering the state's role in marriage.
We can view marriage through multiple facets. Currently, there is a point of view--which the author articulates--that marriage is about building a relationship between two people. Another is that marriage is an economic exchange between a man and a woman; the man exchanges his excess labor capacity for a woman's reproductive capability, i.e. having children and a family, which he cannot do on his own. A variant on this is that marriage is a framework for raising children. Still another reason, and not so common anymore in the US, is that marriage is a political and economic tool for parents and families to build influence and wealth. That summarizes the key reasons for the institution of marriage. The strongest case for marriage as an institution is a combination of points one and two above--namely, that marriage is a tool for formalizing a social relationship between two people, and that it provides a stable framework for the production and maintenance of children.
Where, considering those reasons for the institution, does the state's interest in recognizing and privileging marriage lie?
I submit that the state's interest lies in the "production and maintenance of children" area. A nation's citizenry, in quality and quantity, is its strength. To maintain a competitive edge, a state needs to encourage a positive birthrate--witness the coming "ageing" disaster in Europe, and again here--which has profound implications for demographic makeup, economic/scientific/industrial performance, financial stability, and political outlook. (Note: Understood, Europe is not going to disappear, or become all old people, but having an aging population and a welfare state puts considerable strain on social programs, crowds out younger workplace involvement, and etc. This is a complex topic which I am not going to address here in depth because it touches on a whole mess of areas.)
In addition to a positive birthrate, a state should encourage people to couple-up and raise the children to become productive members of society. This reinforces laws and social customs, both of which are vital to a state's welfare. Having two parents raise children is the ideal situation. It happens with one parent, I am aware, but remember: we are describing what behaviors the state should encourage. There is little evidence that single-parenthood is a behavior that the state should encourage.
In counterpoint to the considerations above, the state should have no role in straightforward social relationships. The government has no material interest in two individuals' "desire to create a social partnership, to live and share life's joys and burdens... and to form a lasting bond and a social identity." I can do all of those things or not, and it has no effect on the greater welfare except perhaps on happiness surveys. Whether I raise a child, on the other hand, does have an effect on the greater welfare, particularly in aggregate.
Now, when the government does accept the premise that it has a place in formalizing "social partnerships", then gay marriage follows seamlessly. However, the government has no mandate, legal or otherwise, to do so. There is absolutely no need for government to regulate and/or encourage social relationships in the first place.
This leaves the business of child-bearing and child-rearing as the government's only stake in the marriage business. The implicit assumption behind traditional marriage is that married couples have children. This has been true for a very long time. While not all married couples have children, the defining characteristic of marriage as a "social partnership" was that a man and woman got married for children and property. When couples did not have children, this was accepted as inefficiencies or wastage in the institution due to the "human factor". Only relatively recently has marriage become about self-actualization. Now, putting off having children or not having children at all is not seen as detrimental to the institution; but why should it be, when the institution is a "social partnership"? The popular perception of marriage in the West has changed dramatically from its beginnings.
This does not change the fact that the only interest that the government has in marriage is the child-bearing and -rearing business. This is the only area where government should apply incentives to encourage a specific set of behavior, namely producing and raising kids.
To do this, the government should cease recognizing, certifying, or otherwise regulating ALL marriages. It should stop offering tax breaks or special tax situations to married couples. It should leave the business of who gets "married" up to individuals and their religious institutions.
What government ought to do is incentivize the behaviors it has an interest in--making and raising babies, independent of marital status. If it is going to offer incentives, it ought to offer dependent-based incentives, such as tax credits and/or other benefits programs, for couples raising children. These benefits would apply regardless of gender, age, or whatever. While there is some dispute over the effects of being raised by gay couples on children, if a gay couple wants to adopt and raise a child, there should be minimal objection to government encouragement of this behavior. It meets the criteria for government interest and societal well-being.
This solution would be fair, across the board. It would allow individuals to make their own lifestyle choices independent of others' particular judgments. It would get the government out of social relationships and into managing the country's future welfare. It would de-link government from a personal, religious practice, and align it instead with demographics. It would re-empower religious and social institutions to define marriage and live within that definition. People are well capable of marrying without a local magistrate's registration of approval.
Further, a "dependent-keeper" status would most likely completely re-arrange current legal marriage laws. It would require a re-thinking of issues currently assigned to divorce law such as child custody. Alimony would probably disappear under this framework, unless there was a separate set of child-bearing/rearing laws explicitly targeted towards mothers and housewives (or the gay equivalent). It would also nullify a hot-button issue by removing marriage as a state-conferred privilege from the table, and there would be no question about equality under the law.
This seems to me to be the best way to address marriage as a whole from a social and societal perspective. I am not certain whether this would be marriage-rate neutral, but it seems to me that it would. The only things it ought to affect are birthrates and family makeup percentages.
To start with, a little background reading: http://www.newsweek.com/id/229957. This presents a cogent argument for the legal approval of gay marriage. To summarize the author's argument:
1. The state recognizes (heterosexual) marriage as a citizen's right
2. The state ought not deny rights to citizens
3. Gays are citizens, too
4. Therefore, the state ought not deny what it has recognized as a citizen's right (marriage) to a class of citizen
This is a valid argument in its current form. If, after all, marriage is "a relationship recognized by governments as providing a privileged and respected status, entitled to the state's support and benefits", and "It is an expression of our desire to create a social partnership, to live and share life's joys and burdens with the person we love, and to form a lasting bond and a social identity", then what's the fuss about? Surely lawmakers ought, barring electoral, (i.e. employment) considerations, to extend that legal right to our gay brethren without any repercussions. So what's the fuss? Rather, what should we do about the fuss?
The author states that, as noted above, marriage is an expression of a desire to create a "social partnership". He uses the implicit assumption that the government should be able to legitimize and incentivize marriage as a social partnership. Now, in all of this, he barely mentions the impacts of marriage and family on the raising of children, or even the state's interest in sanctioning marriage; he makes his points on equality under the law and social partnerships. Given his framework, he is correct; however, if we look at his view on the purpose of marriage and revise it, then we begin to see other avenues of approach for policy. His legal argument and logic is impeccable, and I have no doubt that his prognostication of the future of gay marriage in the US is accurate. Before that happens though, we ought to re-look at how we got into this argument in the first place.
Let's consider marriage, or more particularly, why marriage exists; then, we can move on to considering the state's role in marriage.
We can view marriage through multiple facets. Currently, there is a point of view--which the author articulates--that marriage is about building a relationship between two people. Another is that marriage is an economic exchange between a man and a woman; the man exchanges his excess labor capacity for a woman's reproductive capability, i.e. having children and a family, which he cannot do on his own. A variant on this is that marriage is a framework for raising children. Still another reason, and not so common anymore in the US, is that marriage is a political and economic tool for parents and families to build influence and wealth. That summarizes the key reasons for the institution of marriage. The strongest case for marriage as an institution is a combination of points one and two above--namely, that marriage is a tool for formalizing a social relationship between two people, and that it provides a stable framework for the production and maintenance of children.
Where, considering those reasons for the institution, does the state's interest in recognizing and privileging marriage lie?
I submit that the state's interest lies in the "production and maintenance of children" area. A nation's citizenry, in quality and quantity, is its strength. To maintain a competitive edge, a state needs to encourage a positive birthrate--witness the coming "ageing" disaster in Europe, and again here--which has profound implications for demographic makeup, economic/scientific/industrial performance, financial stability, and political outlook. (Note: Understood, Europe is not going to disappear, or become all old people, but having an aging population and a welfare state puts considerable strain on social programs, crowds out younger workplace involvement, and etc. This is a complex topic which I am not going to address here in depth because it touches on a whole mess of areas.)
In addition to a positive birthrate, a state should encourage people to couple-up and raise the children to become productive members of society. This reinforces laws and social customs, both of which are vital to a state's welfare. Having two parents raise children is the ideal situation. It happens with one parent, I am aware, but remember: we are describing what behaviors the state should encourage. There is little evidence that single-parenthood is a behavior that the state should encourage.
In counterpoint to the considerations above, the state should have no role in straightforward social relationships. The government has no material interest in two individuals' "desire to create a social partnership, to live and share life's joys and burdens... and to form a lasting bond and a social identity." I can do all of those things or not, and it has no effect on the greater welfare except perhaps on happiness surveys. Whether I raise a child, on the other hand, does have an effect on the greater welfare, particularly in aggregate.
Now, when the government does accept the premise that it has a place in formalizing "social partnerships", then gay marriage follows seamlessly. However, the government has no mandate, legal or otherwise, to do so. There is absolutely no need for government to regulate and/or encourage social relationships in the first place.
This leaves the business of child-bearing and child-rearing as the government's only stake in the marriage business. The implicit assumption behind traditional marriage is that married couples have children. This has been true for a very long time. While not all married couples have children, the defining characteristic of marriage as a "social partnership" was that a man and woman got married for children and property. When couples did not have children, this was accepted as inefficiencies or wastage in the institution due to the "human factor". Only relatively recently has marriage become about self-actualization. Now, putting off having children or not having children at all is not seen as detrimental to the institution; but why should it be, when the institution is a "social partnership"? The popular perception of marriage in the West has changed dramatically from its beginnings.
This does not change the fact that the only interest that the government has in marriage is the child-bearing and -rearing business. This is the only area where government should apply incentives to encourage a specific set of behavior, namely producing and raising kids.
To do this, the government should cease recognizing, certifying, or otherwise regulating ALL marriages. It should stop offering tax breaks or special tax situations to married couples. It should leave the business of who gets "married" up to individuals and their religious institutions.
What government ought to do is incentivize the behaviors it has an interest in--making and raising babies, independent of marital status. If it is going to offer incentives, it ought to offer dependent-based incentives, such as tax credits and/or other benefits programs, for couples raising children. These benefits would apply regardless of gender, age, or whatever. While there is some dispute over the effects of being raised by gay couples on children, if a gay couple wants to adopt and raise a child, there should be minimal objection to government encouragement of this behavior. It meets the criteria for government interest and societal well-being.
This solution would be fair, across the board. It would allow individuals to make their own lifestyle choices independent of others' particular judgments. It would get the government out of social relationships and into managing the country's future welfare. It would de-link government from a personal, religious practice, and align it instead with demographics. It would re-empower religious and social institutions to define marriage and live within that definition. People are well capable of marrying without a local magistrate's registration of approval.
Further, a "dependent-keeper" status would most likely completely re-arrange current legal marriage laws. It would require a re-thinking of issues currently assigned to divorce law such as child custody. Alimony would probably disappear under this framework, unless there was a separate set of child-bearing/rearing laws explicitly targeted towards mothers and housewives (or the gay equivalent). It would also nullify a hot-button issue by removing marriage as a state-conferred privilege from the table, and there would be no question about equality under the law.
This seems to me to be the best way to address marriage as a whole from a social and societal perspective. I am not certain whether this would be marriage-rate neutral, but it seems to me that it would. The only things it ought to affect are birthrates and family makeup percentages.
Army Information Sharing, and Solutions To It
The Army puts vast time and resources into something called Knowledge Management. Any user of Army Knowledge Online and its agglomeration of user groups, networks, libraries, menus, and searches, knows that this is a well-intentioned but mostly futile endeavor. It is a blocky, chunked-up system that requires an endless array of credentialing, accounts, and searches to do anything. Worse, the Army requires that most personnel functions be accomplished through the online system.
The in-theater information management system is also terrible. You might think that the Army has a streamlined, easy-to-use information system. Nope. The Army does have a system where you can spend half an hour looking up a phone number, and discover that it's the wrong number for someone who left the country months ago. This is because sites require constant maintenance, which gets progressively lower in priority the longer a unit has been deployed, and the more times it has changed personnel out. You may find some of the information you need for a specific staff section, but you will only do that after dodging dead-link minefields, outdated and un-maintained sites, and so forth. Then, the document will only be about an 70% solution to your question, as it was produced for a totally different reason. Trying to find a simple document is extremely challenging, though to the Army's credit, there is typically some sort of search function that may help if you're really astute with keywords. And very patient.
If you are trying to get an answer to a question that isn't in a product somewhere, you have to resort to email and phone calls to get ahold of the person who knows what you're talking about. More than once, I have sent out an email question to someone, only to get the 20-email thread back in two days and see that the last person referred the thread to me as the subject matter expert. If I knew the answer, I wouldn't have asked! Now I am back at square one, and don't know where the email chain should have branched to get me to the right person.
Why is this worth valuable electrons and your time to read about?
Well, one of the key challenges the Army (or whole military, as most large operations are now joint) faces is sharing relevant information in a timely fashion across all organizations that need it. This is a formidable task. When one organization partners with Iraqis, for instance, and writes a report or hears some useful information, that information typically has applications all over the country. If that information isn't disseminated in a timely manner, then huge amounts of time and energy are expended trying to accomplish the exact same task that has been accomplished before. Winning wars and building nations is tough enough, but try to do it twice, concurrently, and you get the idea.
Information handling is vital to conducting synchronized operations across literally hundreds of staff sections and organizations, and yet the Army's response leaves huge gaps in awareness of reports, policies, orders, statistics, and meetings. Half of the meetings (in this SM's humble estimation) are conducted because someone is trying to find out information that other people already know. This causes a huge cascading effect, where meetings are held to prep for other meetings, which are in turn used to prep for other meetings, which are used to prep for other meetings, the results of which are then taken to a decision-maker for judgment. I do not offer exaggeration on the layers of CYA pre-meetings that are necessary to get a decision or guidance. While some meetings are necessary for discussion and analysis, most meetings should happen to make decisions or when a discussion is absolutely necessary.
Poor information management causes vast waste of time and effort.
But does it have to be this way? I suggest not. Let's look at some alternate tools for awareness.
There is technology available to make information sharing easier. For instance, let's take a look at a typical division website. There is a scrolling SIGACT bar that someone put in; there is a set of outdated links, or perhaps links to the unit's internal portal, which is great for the unit but terrible for anyone else trying to get information. The staff section links will go to pages with little useful information. If I know someone in the unit has something that I want, getting it takes ten times longer than it should when I have to do a separate research project to find a current staff roster, call the person, and wait for him to dig up the information.
While the unit's internal portal may be useful and have information, that information does no one any good if it's not accessible and if other folks don't know it's there. Critical reports, assessments, and data sheets often languish without potential customers being able to see them, and sites go un-updated due to lack of trained site-maintainers. How can we remedy this?
Simple: Use a market solution. There have been very few things in history that the government can do better than private enterprise, and this is not one of those things.
Pay Google to re-vamp the search, archiving, and information management system, like with a Google search engine, Wave, and Google Docs. I'll bet a paycheck that the company could set up a much more efficient and effective system for the military for less than the current system's cost outlay.
Use Twitter to ask and answer questions in real-time.
Use the available technology and tools to get people away from the static section web-page concept, and get them tied in together for cloud computing, real-time messaging and information boards, feeds, and whatever else works for sharing information to the right people at the right time.
Let's get away from fact-finding meetings and move towards getting accurate, current information to decision-makers. It's time to move on to doing other productive things, like winning, and putting our soldiers' time and effort to better use than trying to building Sharepoint that no one looks at.
The in-theater information management system is also terrible. You might think that the Army has a streamlined, easy-to-use information system. Nope. The Army does have a system where you can spend half an hour looking up a phone number, and discover that it's the wrong number for someone who left the country months ago. This is because sites require constant maintenance, which gets progressively lower in priority the longer a unit has been deployed, and the more times it has changed personnel out. You may find some of the information you need for a specific staff section, but you will only do that after dodging dead-link minefields, outdated and un-maintained sites, and so forth. Then, the document will only be about an 70% solution to your question, as it was produced for a totally different reason. Trying to find a simple document is extremely challenging, though to the Army's credit, there is typically some sort of search function that may help if you're really astute with keywords. And very patient.
If you are trying to get an answer to a question that isn't in a product somewhere, you have to resort to email and phone calls to get ahold of the person who knows what you're talking about. More than once, I have sent out an email question to someone, only to get the 20-email thread back in two days and see that the last person referred the thread to me as the subject matter expert. If I knew the answer, I wouldn't have asked! Now I am back at square one, and don't know where the email chain should have branched to get me to the right person.
Why is this worth valuable electrons and your time to read about?
Well, one of the key challenges the Army (or whole military, as most large operations are now joint) faces is sharing relevant information in a timely fashion across all organizations that need it. This is a formidable task. When one organization partners with Iraqis, for instance, and writes a report or hears some useful information, that information typically has applications all over the country. If that information isn't disseminated in a timely manner, then huge amounts of time and energy are expended trying to accomplish the exact same task that has been accomplished before. Winning wars and building nations is tough enough, but try to do it twice, concurrently, and you get the idea.
Information handling is vital to conducting synchronized operations across literally hundreds of staff sections and organizations, and yet the Army's response leaves huge gaps in awareness of reports, policies, orders, statistics, and meetings. Half of the meetings (in this SM's humble estimation) are conducted because someone is trying to find out information that other people already know. This causes a huge cascading effect, where meetings are held to prep for other meetings, which are in turn used to prep for other meetings, which are used to prep for other meetings, the results of which are then taken to a decision-maker for judgment. I do not offer exaggeration on the layers of CYA pre-meetings that are necessary to get a decision or guidance. While some meetings are necessary for discussion and analysis, most meetings should happen to make decisions or when a discussion is absolutely necessary.
Poor information management causes vast waste of time and effort.
But does it have to be this way? I suggest not. Let's look at some alternate tools for awareness.
There is technology available to make information sharing easier. For instance, let's take a look at a typical division website. There is a scrolling SIGACT bar that someone put in; there is a set of outdated links, or perhaps links to the unit's internal portal, which is great for the unit but terrible for anyone else trying to get information. The staff section links will go to pages with little useful information. If I know someone in the unit has something that I want, getting it takes ten times longer than it should when I have to do a separate research project to find a current staff roster, call the person, and wait for him to dig up the information.
While the unit's internal portal may be useful and have information, that information does no one any good if it's not accessible and if other folks don't know it's there. Critical reports, assessments, and data sheets often languish without potential customers being able to see them, and sites go un-updated due to lack of trained site-maintainers. How can we remedy this?
Simple: Use a market solution. There have been very few things in history that the government can do better than private enterprise, and this is not one of those things.
Pay Google to re-vamp the search, archiving, and information management system, like with a Google search engine, Wave, and Google Docs. I'll bet a paycheck that the company could set up a much more efficient and effective system for the military for less than the current system's cost outlay.
Use Twitter to ask and answer questions in real-time.
Use the available technology and tools to get people away from the static section web-page concept, and get them tied in together for cloud computing, real-time messaging and information boards, feeds, and whatever else works for sharing information to the right people at the right time.
Let's get away from fact-finding meetings and move towards getting accurate, current information to decision-makers. It's time to move on to doing other productive things, like winning, and putting our soldiers' time and effort to better use than trying to building Sharepoint that no one looks at.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
DA Photos are Divisive and Costly
DA photos are racist. For those not in the know, DA photos are pictures of a soldier that go on his record brief to be looked at for promotions and other activities. For instance:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1SG_Carl_E._Howard_DA_Photo.jpg
You don't believe me? Here are reasons that I have run across that might justify getting a DA photo:
1. Shows professionalism for the promotions board
2. Serves as photo for a funeral ceremony if a soldier gets killed
Reason 2 is a last-ditch, urban legend reason. I haven't heard any actual soldiers or anyone else cite it, so while it may be true, it is of secondary importance. Which takes us to the main question: Is reason 1 really necessary? Do these board members sit around and really look at ribbons and compare awards to the records? Do they inspect haircuts for the photo in order to judge professionalism, over the contents of the ORB and the officer's OERs?
Here's the regulation:
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/R640_30.pdf
It states:
"The photograph is an important representation of the Soldier. It is of particular interest during DA selection boards and career management activities."
Really? Why is that?
That statement is disingenuous. It means exactly what it says, but it's phrased to make people think that it's about evaluating a soldier's professionalism and qualifications. I think it's to ensure that the boards meet goals for ethnic and/or gender representation. There is no reason that a board needs a photo to represent a soldier other than to visually verify the soldier's race, his/her gender, and general physical attractiveness (which matters even for guys-- attractive people generally make better first impressions than do ugly ones). It's a great PR tool.
Let's see: Do photos like these affect promotion decisions for the wrong reasons?
http://www.bragg.army.mil/DA_Photo/thephoto.htm
Is there anything in these photos that cannot be represented on an Officer Record Brief, which lists all assignments, awards, schools, height, weight, security clearance, educational background, branch, home of record, and other qualifications? Or an OER, which is based on superiors' feedback of a soldier's job performance?
So what, you say, let's let kids be kids and play ball.
NO. Not only does this become a horrendous waste of soldier and Army time, effort, and money (see the policy above), but it's a PC tool to ensure that the Army looks good, instead of ensuring that the Army can do its job. It's another example, a bright idea, to ensure that someone can carefully pick a mix of promotees to match the Army concept of equal opportunity and gender/race equality. Enough of that crap. It's affirmative action, and it's divisive and counterproductive. It introduces doubt about the qualifications of minorities and women who have been promoted, regardless about whether those individuals are qualified or not. Or, if you want to go the other way with the argument, it gives the opportunity for board officers to discriminate against minorities and/or women. It is not fair to anyone regardless of how you care to spin it.
The Army, and in particular its soldiers--our nation's sons and daughters--deserves people who are qualified to do their jobs, not people selected to fill a slot.
Only by positing a neutral board do we see any benefit (excluding the soldier's time spent preparing for and getting the photo, the unit's time without the soldier, and the expense of maintaining DA photo studios at every base), but please refer to my proposal below for saving time...
Let's do it this way: Get rid of the photo and eliminate visibility of the person's name during the board selection process. Evaluate on qualifications, experience, and performance. If the board can take the time to read OERs, the ORB, and look at the photo now, let's save them some time and get rid of the photo. Any takers?
I cannot find any history of the DA photo policy; if I've missed something big, I welcome feedback and additional information.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1SG_Carl_E._Howard_DA_Photo.jpg
You don't believe me? Here are reasons that I have run across that might justify getting a DA photo:
1. Shows professionalism for the promotions board
2. Serves as photo for a funeral ceremony if a soldier gets killed
Reason 2 is a last-ditch, urban legend reason. I haven't heard any actual soldiers or anyone else cite it, so while it may be true, it is of secondary importance. Which takes us to the main question: Is reason 1 really necessary? Do these board members sit around and really look at ribbons and compare awards to the records? Do they inspect haircuts for the photo in order to judge professionalism, over the contents of the ORB and the officer's OERs?
Here's the regulation:
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/R640_30.pdf
It states:
"The photograph is an important representation of the Soldier. It is of particular interest during DA selection boards and career management activities."
Really? Why is that?
That statement is disingenuous. It means exactly what it says, but it's phrased to make people think that it's about evaluating a soldier's professionalism and qualifications. I think it's to ensure that the boards meet goals for ethnic and/or gender representation. There is no reason that a board needs a photo to represent a soldier other than to visually verify the soldier's race, his/her gender, and general physical attractiveness (which matters even for guys-- attractive people generally make better first impressions than do ugly ones). It's a great PR tool.
Let's see: Do photos like these affect promotion decisions for the wrong reasons?
http://www.bragg.army.mil/DA_Photo/thephoto.htm
Is there anything in these photos that cannot be represented on an Officer Record Brief, which lists all assignments, awards, schools, height, weight, security clearance, educational background, branch, home of record, and other qualifications? Or an OER, which is based on superiors' feedback of a soldier's job performance?
So what, you say, let's let kids be kids and play ball.
NO. Not only does this become a horrendous waste of soldier and Army time, effort, and money (see the policy above), but it's a PC tool to ensure that the Army looks good, instead of ensuring that the Army can do its job. It's another example, a bright idea, to ensure that someone can carefully pick a mix of promotees to match the Army concept of equal opportunity and gender/race equality. Enough of that crap. It's affirmative action, and it's divisive and counterproductive. It introduces doubt about the qualifications of minorities and women who have been promoted, regardless about whether those individuals are qualified or not. Or, if you want to go the other way with the argument, it gives the opportunity for board officers to discriminate against minorities and/or women. It is not fair to anyone regardless of how you care to spin it.
The Army, and in particular its soldiers--our nation's sons and daughters--deserves people who are qualified to do their jobs, not people selected to fill a slot.
Only by positing a neutral board do we see any benefit (excluding the soldier's time spent preparing for and getting the photo, the unit's time without the soldier, and the expense of maintaining DA photo studios at every base), but please refer to my proposal below for saving time...
Let's do it this way: Get rid of the photo and eliminate visibility of the person's name during the board selection process. Evaluate on qualifications, experience, and performance. If the board can take the time to read OERs, the ORB, and look at the photo now, let's save them some time and get rid of the photo. Any takers?
I cannot find any history of the DA photo policy; if I've missed something big, I welcome feedback and additional information.
Friday, January 1, 2010
Can the Army be Efficient? Pt 4: Objections
I fully understand that there are several good objections to the idea of a free-market structure for our military's personnel management. I've outlined some of the ones I've thought of, and some work-arounds or solutions.
1.) There's no point! Reason: The free-market system is driven by the profit motive. The Army is in a non-competitive environment, fueled by taxpayer dollars, managed at government pleasure, and engaged in a business where winning and losing is determined not by market share or profits, but by wars won or lost, regional stability, and casualties. There is no profit motive; ergo, the Army cannot play free-market in this environment.
This is a valid and very dangerous (to my argument) point. That the Army doesn't have the same profit motives as other industries is indisputable. On the other hand, something motivates units to perform. Is it superiors' orders? Is it a devotion to duty? Is it individual recognition? Is it money? Is it a combination of all of the above? Businesses in the civilian world exist to make money, but individuals in those businesses also have motivations that don't necessarily exclude incentives other than money. Likewise, pretending that soldiers work only for reasons unrelated to money is ignorant. The problem at hand is creating a framework of incentives that is analogous to the civilian marketplace and applies to individuals in the army as well as units themselves. On the individual level, the marketplace model works fine; on the unit level, we run into problems of evaluation and performance. My proposed solution of using a combination of training event evaluations and real-world mission evaluations tied to monetary/budgetary compensation is far from perfect, but it's more performance-oriented than the planning system we have now.
The other side of the profit-motive coin is losses. What would happen to an under-performing army unit? Would it be decommissioned, all of its officers fired, and everyone spilled into the DoD personnel pool? Would its leadership simply be fired by the "Board" (i.e. DoD or JCS)? This is a serious issue, but I think it can be addressed by one of the latter means. There has to be an alternative to profitability to drive performance, and in this case I think it's strongly tied to leadership losing jobs after sub-optimal performance. This could be applicable down to the small-unit level as well; right now, firing someone in the Army can be a tortuous process, and units are not guaranteed replacements. Under my framework, this situation might improve because of the availability of a pool of potential "employees".
2) Doesn't this logically point to forming a mercenary army, and a loss of civilian control over the military?
Not necessarily. As long as the government doesn't outsource standing-army military functions to outside businesses-- that is, as long as the government employs people directly--then the government can exert the same control over the military that it does now. But let's look at this a bit more closely. Would a mercenary army be a bad thing? That's a whole other topic, but the main issue with that idea seems to be the concept of civilian (governmental) control over the contracting entity. Having direct governmental control is necessary to prevent disclosure of state secrets, pre-empting coups, maintaining a strong standing army in accordance with national strategy goals, and having a stick that the good ol' US of A can beat bad people with. Now, there's not a lot in that list that can't be put into a long-term contract with a Triple-Canopy type organization, but I'm not ready to make the leap of faith and separate defense organically from the government.
3) Wouldn't an open marketplace lead to bribery and corruption among job seekers and units?
I don't think so. Bribes to people would probably fall under the category of "salary" and "signing bonuses"; kickbacks to units could be a problem, but since salaries would be tracked, serious irregularities could be monitored. Past the individual's salary, there wouldn't be a lot of money to give kickbacks with, which would seriously limit the amount of kicking-back going on. Unit funds would be controlled and tracked on a DOD-audit-able system, instead of units having closed books and receiving carte-blanche funding from the gov't. If there are other possibilities
4) Is the current system so inefficient that it would merit this sort of sea-change in culture and process? That's a lot of upheaval, and we can't afford to have our pants down in this day and age.
Again, I don't have the HRC databases to show what HRC is doing with its resources and constraints. I do know that centrally planned systems analogous to HRC's are typically inefficient and wasteful, so while I can't point out systemic waste, I have no doubt that it occurs. The evidence I have as to HRC inefficiency is purely anecdotal. As to the overall benefit, overall readiness would likely improve, retention of the right people would increase, recruiting (as needed) would become easier, and we'd see better leadership in the military.
5) Wouldn't this cause a loss of the military culture needed to fight and win the nation's wars?
Doubtful. Money's a huge incentive for performance, regardless of patriotism and service motivators. To ignore its potential for encouraging maximum performance out of our service members is naive at best. The Army's been offering huge bonuses lately, in addition to all sorts of other benefit packages to keep service members in; why not call a spade a spade, and tie salary to performance?
Soldiers are motivated by many things, and money is not least among them. Maintaining military tradition, pride, patriotism, and so forth, would still be possible and encouraged by unit tradition.
6) It may be a good idea, or an idea with good points, but it'll never happen. The military's too entrenched culturally and resistant to change.
Ok, you win on that one.
Comments always welcome.
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