All right. Let's play a game. Suppose, for instance, that you are a consultant.
Then suppose, contrary to all of your previous knowledge about how consulting is supposed to work, you pay your client for the privilege of advising him, instead of him paying you for your expertise.
Now suppose that your client only occasionally wants to take your advice, and only puts up with you being around to advise him because you are paying him.
This is what is going on in Iraq right now. It is of course a gross oversimplification of the whole situation, but several essential elements remain:
1) We are training and equipping Iraq's government. This is not limited to just training the army, but encompasses advising on all aspects of the functioning government.
2) The Government of Iraq doesn't have to do anything that we tell them to. Since the July 30, 2009 security agreement, the Iraqis have been running their own country. Certainly, there are bumps along the way, but they are doing it.
3) The US has a purely advisory role. Every operation we do is partnered; most aspects of interaction with the GoI are focused on increasing capacity and streamlining systems.
There's a saying that's frequently bandied about on the US side of the house-- "An Iraqi [or Arab] solution for an Iraqi [again, or Arab] problem", coming from some saying from TE Lawrence, aka Lawrence of Arabia. It's meant to be a reminder that the US cannot expect that US solutions to Iraqi problems will work. There are too many competing local tribal, sectarian, and political issues in the mix for the US to impose solutions to many of what we perceive as problems.
Unfortunately, Iraq has become a staging ground for a whole host of commands, each bent on "doing something!" to look good, expand individual fiefdoms, or otherwise get promoted. The practical effect of this is that whenever the GoI is not handling something like the US thinks it should, there's a whole flurry of activity--research, briefings, more briefings, and some meetings--to conclude what this junior SM could have told you up front-- that the Iraqis will do what they damn well please, when they want it, and unless they want to do it, then USF ain't doin' squat. But unless those briefings happen, then higher-ups can't pretend to make decisions that mainly involve playing at diplomat and doing KLEs (that's Key Leader Engagement, for the uninitiated) in the hope of getting a recalcitrant partner to do something we want him to do.
And yet we continue to spin our wheels and panic when the Iraqis don't do what we want. At the same time, USF frequently completely disregard the Iraqis' motivations or wants. In a recent meeting, Your Intrepid Blogger noted a particular instance about training priorities:
Person A: Are these American Training priorities, or have the Iraqis had input into this?
*cricket*
Let the record show that the training priority had something to do with MILES., which is an American training system and is about the second-to-last thing that Iraq needs right now, right before snowplows for Basrah. But it's not just about equipment or training. This projection extends to everything the US does-- we desperately want to influence or push the Iraqis to do things, but can't stand to see them taking care of business on their own and at their own pace.
It's a shame. We want the US solution to the Iraqi problem. An Iraqi solution might work, but it wouldn't look as good on an OER, that's for sure. I can't help but get the feeling (and admittedly, I am removed from a lot of the action, being on staff and all) that we are simply cannon fodder for officers to pad their joint billet time in an only mildly threatening theater where there is minimal risk of failure. I am sure the Iraqis love having Americans over to tell them what to do. At this point, we're just a checkbook, and they'll pass on the partnership, thanks very much.
