We're still in Afghanistan. Stan McChrystal has been relieved because of an ostensibly unintentionally offensive (to the People's Administration) Rolling Stone Article. Gen. Dave Petraeus has taken over / been put in charge. We've implemented a temporary surge, at least until 2011... or until military prudence dictates, depending on who you listen to, and when.
So what exactly are we doing in Afghanistan? If you listen to popular wisdom, we're in it to either a) improve US national security or b) build a peaceful, stable Afghanistan by improving their armed forces and government.
Here's my take. We did Objective A a while ago, when we ousted the Taliban with our horse-soldiers. We've been dilly-dallying around for the past 9 years. We have achieved little concrete progress on Objective B.
A little background: Afghanistan is comprised of a variety of peoples and cultures in a Biblical landscape that has historically been ungovernable for any length of time over the majority of the country. Ask the British, Indians, Pakistanis, Russians, or the Afghans themselves. That is, if you can find any who identify themselves as Afghans as opposed to Hazaras, Pashtuns, etc.
So Objective B is a mighty formidable task. We're just getting around to it after dealing with Iraq (which was doing pretty well until they had to do that little transition-of-power thing, just as we're doing our transition-the-hell-out-of-there thing). We have neglected Afghanistan, for a variety of reasons, for most of the past decade. But it's now on the front burner because of an essential need to polish certain foreign-policy credentials.
Let's look at the future and past, past first. We have what economists might call a series of sunk costs in Afghanistan--considerable time, effort, funding, and lives lost in the country. In determining what our future course of action should be, these considerations should be... absolutely 0. Sunk Costs should have no bearing on our future course of action.
I'm going to say that again, because it's important--just like you wouldn't throw good money after bad (because doing so makes good money bad), and like you should learn to fold in poker before losing your chips on a mediocre hand, it's vitally important that we learn that sunk costs have no bearing on our future success. They do have an important psychological effect, but one that most financial psychologists/analysts is detrimental to investing success. Make no mistake about it, we're investing in Afghanistan--but what kind of returns are we trying to get?
So now, the Future. What SHOULD have bearing on our future course of action is this question: Does staying in Afghanistan to build a nation improve our own national well-being? That is the ONLY question we should be asking, and it's the only basis that we should be evaluating our strategy on.
Here are considerations in answering that question:
Question: Does a stable, secure Afghanistan, in fact, improve our national security significantly past where we already are? Does it warrant staying versus just going back to kick Taliban butt if they re-organize later? I think the answer is no, personally--we could achieve some great results leaving a few A-team advisors in country with Dept of State doing its liaison/advisory thing. One argument for staying is that we need to prevent the resurgence of Al-Qaeda. I don't buy it. For one thing, Al-Qaeda is a global organization, hardly based in Afghanistan. We'd be better off focusing on the problem of Iran, or Pakistan, or... well, pick your poison. Afghanistan is not the key to combating Islamic extremism.
Question 2: What is our end-state? Afghanistan is centuries behind Iraq. Most of the country is still working through the 10th century. Do we want to make it look like France? I don't think we can. I think Anne Coulter and Mike Steele may have a point. I think Afghanistan is worth getting out of, yesterday. We are not going to make it into a stable, secure state. It is simply not configured for a central government outside of the major urban centers--and even those have historically been trouble spots. I'd be interested to see where we can succeed after everyone else has decided to give up on it, but I feel that we're throwing good money, lives, and time after bad at this point.
The only argument that I see holding water for staying in the country is this--that the US may suffer a blow to its reputation or credibility on foreign affairs. That's a legitimate concern. I also figure it'll make a good weekend assignment to the diplomatic corps to craft an intelligent statement that shows that we're not idiots, and we know to quit when our goals have in fact been achieved. It can be done in a thoughtful, deliberate way that doesn't signal weakness or stupidity to the Chinese and Iranians.
But in the meantime, let's marshal our resources and will to use where they matter--and that isn't in Afghanistan.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Sexual equality and the Army PT Test
Many reasonable people will agree that if Group A only has to score one-quarter as well on an ability test as Group B to be considered equally capable to Group B, then you've got preferences occurring. If you mixed gender or race into this--if you had a school that admitted black students with 1/4 the GPA that it required white students to have--you'd note accurately that you were observing a case of discrimination, or affirmative action--however you want to term it.
The question is what circumstances warrant having differing standards for different groups based on arbitrary judgments about the value of those groups.
Ideally, those circumstances are not outcome or performance based. We don't want to introduce those arbitrary judgments into situations where there is a real, objective, measurable outcome based on the ability of the groups. Handicapping or helping certain groups would distort the outcome of the sorting mechanism--the ability test would no longer be a valid indicator of ability. The overall outcome would be a reduced overall capability for the aggregate group.
This is exactly what is happening in the Army with its sex-divided Physical Training (PT) standards. The Army Physical Fitness Test consists of 3 events: Pushups, situps, and a 2-mile run. Each of these events is graded by number of repetitions, and is scaled for age and sex. The minimum passing score for each event is 60 points, and the maximum is 100 points.
For instance: A 19-year-old female soldier who completes 19 pushups scores 60 points. If she completes 42 pushups, she scores 100 points. A 19-year-old male soldier has to do 42 pushups for his 60 points, and maxes out at 71 repetitions. For situps, the male/female scales are equal. For the run, the scale is again unequal. The male passes his run at a time of 15:54, and the female passes at 18:54. The max score times are 13:00 and 15:36, respectively.
That makes sense, right? Males are typically larger, stronger, and faster than females. The score distributions and scales were based on testing many, many people to develop reasonable expectations of fitness. Therefore, the scales should account for physiological differences between males and females.
There's only one problem with this. Men and women are both in the Army. The Army occasionally requires its members to do things like be in combat, or perform various physically difficult tasks. Men and women are both permitted in many of the same jobs, and are likely to end up doing very similar things throughout their careers. The 115-lb woman who can do 42 pushups may be in the same position as a 200-lb man who can do 71. A PT test scaled for sex nicely captures the difference between male and female capabilities, but does nothing to answer the important question: What is the minimum standard of physical fitness for a soldier?
This is particularly pertinent because physical fitness scores are noted on performance evaluations, and can be cause to get someone kicked out of the Army. A male who can bench 300 lbs may be at risk for being chaptered out for being a slow runner, but the 95-lb female who can run but can't lift a 40-lb box will stay in. Or vice versa. You get the picture.
By allowing women to have lower physical standards, the Army is doing a couple things wrong. It is acknowledging either that A) it is putting physically unqualified women into positions where they are likely to fail, or B) the requirements that it imposes on men are far too high for what the job requirements actually are. This approach also engenders resentment on the part of men, and a feeling of inferiority on the part of women. It is similar to affirmative action in this regard.
I suggest this fix: Align physical fitness standards to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). If Infantrymen need to meet higher physical standards--and they do--than, say, intel weenies, then it's unfair to the infantrymen and the intel weenies. The Intel weenies don't need to have a high PT standard. The Infantrymen do. The force would benefit by having higher official PT standards for its infantrymen, and lower standards for its intel analysts, who probably don't need to be training on push-ups anyway. It would get and retain more analysts, both male and female. Having an aggregate PT standard for each sex imposes unnecessary requirements and restrictions on each of the MOS's, which do radically different jobs.
Additionally, this division by MOS would solve the very important problem of differing standards of physical fitness for men and women. A MOS-specific PT test, with the same standards for men and women, would clearly show what the minimum standard is. It would not grant a free pass to anyone. It would not penalize anyone. It would simply say that to be a generator repair mechanic, you have to be able to do X pushups and X situps and haul your butt around a 2-mile course in X time.
This would be a very good solution to matching qualified personnel to job positions, and it would eliminate the male-female PT standard divide. It would end the perception that women can't hack the Army that men have to. It would better separate who is suited for what job. For an organization as proud of proclaiming its reliance and adherence on standards, the Army has hopelessly bolo'ed this matter for decades, and this is an easy fix.
The question is what circumstances warrant having differing standards for different groups based on arbitrary judgments about the value of those groups.
Ideally, those circumstances are not outcome or performance based. We don't want to introduce those arbitrary judgments into situations where there is a real, objective, measurable outcome based on the ability of the groups. Handicapping or helping certain groups would distort the outcome of the sorting mechanism--the ability test would no longer be a valid indicator of ability. The overall outcome would be a reduced overall capability for the aggregate group.
This is exactly what is happening in the Army with its sex-divided Physical Training (PT) standards. The Army Physical Fitness Test consists of 3 events: Pushups, situps, and a 2-mile run. Each of these events is graded by number of repetitions, and is scaled for age and sex. The minimum passing score for each event is 60 points, and the maximum is 100 points.
For instance: A 19-year-old female soldier who completes 19 pushups scores 60 points. If she completes 42 pushups, she scores 100 points. A 19-year-old male soldier has to do 42 pushups for his 60 points, and maxes out at 71 repetitions. For situps, the male/female scales are equal. For the run, the scale is again unequal. The male passes his run at a time of 15:54, and the female passes at 18:54. The max score times are 13:00 and 15:36, respectively.
That makes sense, right? Males are typically larger, stronger, and faster than females. The score distributions and scales were based on testing many, many people to develop reasonable expectations of fitness. Therefore, the scales should account for physiological differences between males and females.
There's only one problem with this. Men and women are both in the Army. The Army occasionally requires its members to do things like be in combat, or perform various physically difficult tasks. Men and women are both permitted in many of the same jobs, and are likely to end up doing very similar things throughout their careers. The 115-lb woman who can do 42 pushups may be in the same position as a 200-lb man who can do 71. A PT test scaled for sex nicely captures the difference between male and female capabilities, but does nothing to answer the important question: What is the minimum standard of physical fitness for a soldier?
This is particularly pertinent because physical fitness scores are noted on performance evaluations, and can be cause to get someone kicked out of the Army. A male who can bench 300 lbs may be at risk for being chaptered out for being a slow runner, but the 95-lb female who can run but can't lift a 40-lb box will stay in. Or vice versa. You get the picture.
By allowing women to have lower physical standards, the Army is doing a couple things wrong. It is acknowledging either that A) it is putting physically unqualified women into positions where they are likely to fail, or B) the requirements that it imposes on men are far too high for what the job requirements actually are. This approach also engenders resentment on the part of men, and a feeling of inferiority on the part of women. It is similar to affirmative action in this regard.
I suggest this fix: Align physical fitness standards to Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). If Infantrymen need to meet higher physical standards--and they do--than, say, intel weenies, then it's unfair to the infantrymen and the intel weenies. The Intel weenies don't need to have a high PT standard. The Infantrymen do. The force would benefit by having higher official PT standards for its infantrymen, and lower standards for its intel analysts, who probably don't need to be training on push-ups anyway. It would get and retain more analysts, both male and female. Having an aggregate PT standard for each sex imposes unnecessary requirements and restrictions on each of the MOS's, which do radically different jobs.
Additionally, this division by MOS would solve the very important problem of differing standards of physical fitness for men and women. A MOS-specific PT test, with the same standards for men and women, would clearly show what the minimum standard is. It would not grant a free pass to anyone. It would not penalize anyone. It would simply say that to be a generator repair mechanic, you have to be able to do X pushups and X situps and haul your butt around a 2-mile course in X time.
This would be a very good solution to matching qualified personnel to job positions, and it would eliminate the male-female PT standard divide. It would end the perception that women can't hack the Army that men have to. It would better separate who is suited for what job. For an organization as proud of proclaiming its reliance and adherence on standards, the Army has hopelessly bolo'ed this matter for decades, and this is an easy fix.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Judging B-School Admissions Chances
I'm thinking of applying to a couple of name-brand business schools that I'm competitive for.
I assess that I'm competitive because my scores are well within the range of the schools' class profiles. However, what would really help me out in assessing my chances would be knowing the characteristics of the applicant pool. I am particularly interested in correlation of GMAT scores with admit rates.
For instance, say School A has an applicant pool of 10000, and admits 1000. The admit rate is 10%. Then the school comes out and says its admit profile has a middle 50% GMAT range of (for instance) 690-750. This is wonderful, and with the 80% spread can give a pretty good picture of what the normalized curve for the entering class looks like. But that tells me nothing about my chances before I get in; it merely says how I'll fit in once I get there.
If I had the applicant pool profile, then I could match up the normal curve of the applicant pool with that of the admit pool--overlay them, almost-- and see if the left end of the Applicant GMAT curve significantly overlaps the left end of the Admit GMAT curve significantly enough to rule out most of the low-end of the applicant pool.
Note that schools do not release profiles of their applicant pools. This must be to increase the number of people applying by preventing people from seeing that they don't have a very good chance of getting in. They can claim to be a) not basing admissions on test scores, and b) getting lots of applicants to get their admit ratios low and keep exclusivity up. In other words, they are having their cake and eating it too.
I assess that the 10% admit rate in the example is actually closer to 40%, maybe 50%, of qualified candidates, i.e. those that match the general class profile. Now, to be truthful, I do not have any statistics to back that up, other than to say that the mean GMAT score nationwide is around 530, and that a lot of people apply to exclusive schools just because they are exclusive. Assuming that 2/3 of the GMAT test-takers do actually get scores between 400 and 600, as the test is designed, and standard deviation is about 100 points... well, I would be very interested to see the applicant pool stats vs admit pool stats. I think we'd be very surprised what the admit rate is for people who fit the class admit pool.
While the applicant pool is probably skewed high based on the caliber of school, I don't think that solely geniuses are all applying to Harvard. Why? There aren't enough of them for the top-20 schools. See the next bit..
Now, I could be totally off base and all the normal people could be scared off by the high mean GMAT of the schools. However, this doesn't pass the sniff test. If I'm average Joe, I might not apply to the exclusive school... but the cost of the application (in time and money) might be worth the return, especially because I know the school admits at least a few low-end scores. Might be my lucky day, or something.
What we do know then is that a lot of folks apply to multiple schools, and we have a lot of lower-tier GMAT applicants as well. We also know that top schools admit mostly top GMAT performers.
Keep in mind that the GMAT takers number includes International students as well, which are taking the GMAT in equal or greater numbers to US takers. What I am leaving out of my analysis is the folks who have legacy GMAT scores (like who keep scores on file for a couple of years and then apply) because 1) not all of the top GMAT takers apply to the exclusive schools, 2) not all GMAT takers apply to schools period, and 3) it's a rolling process, so I assume that the carry-overs from last year replace the ones who wait this year.
So what is the takeaway? If you're applying to a top B-School or other school that requires the GMAT, and you're facing great odds... like the 10000 apps vs 1000 slots crunch... and you have a high GMAT, you probably don't have to worry about quite as much as you thought you did. And you can still tell people you got into a really selective school.
If you had an average GMAT, then you need to be really really special, because you're competing with the high scores that comprise the majority of slots, and the low-scores are relatively rare at the selective schools.
I still want to see the applicant pool profile. But I suspect we never will, because it would mean too much in prestige and applications revenue.
Feedback and help with my math would be greatly appreciated.
I assess that I'm competitive because my scores are well within the range of the schools' class profiles. However, what would really help me out in assessing my chances would be knowing the characteristics of the applicant pool. I am particularly interested in correlation of GMAT scores with admit rates.
For instance, say School A has an applicant pool of 10000, and admits 1000. The admit rate is 10%. Then the school comes out and says its admit profile has a middle 50% GMAT range of (for instance) 690-750. This is wonderful, and with the 80% spread can give a pretty good picture of what the normalized curve for the entering class looks like. But that tells me nothing about my chances before I get in; it merely says how I'll fit in once I get there.
If I had the applicant pool profile, then I could match up the normal curve of the applicant pool with that of the admit pool--overlay them, almost-- and see if the left end of the Applicant GMAT curve significantly overlaps the left end of the Admit GMAT curve significantly enough to rule out most of the low-end of the applicant pool.
Note that schools do not release profiles of their applicant pools. This must be to increase the number of people applying by preventing people from seeing that they don't have a very good chance of getting in. They can claim to be a) not basing admissions on test scores, and b) getting lots of applicants to get their admit ratios low and keep exclusivity up. In other words, they are having their cake and eating it too.
I assess that the 10% admit rate in the example is actually closer to 40%, maybe 50%, of qualified candidates, i.e. those that match the general class profile. Now, to be truthful, I do not have any statistics to back that up, other than to say that the mean GMAT score nationwide is around 530, and that a lot of people apply to exclusive schools just because they are exclusive. Assuming that 2/3 of the GMAT test-takers do actually get scores between 400 and 600, as the test is designed, and standard deviation is about 100 points... well, I would be very interested to see the applicant pool stats vs admit pool stats. I think we'd be very surprised what the admit rate is for people who fit the class admit pool.
While the applicant pool is probably skewed high based on the caliber of school, I don't think that solely geniuses are all applying to Harvard. Why? There aren't enough of them for the top-20 schools. See the next bit..
The applicant pool we're interested in are about 2 standard deviations above the mean--actually, with a 690 and above, we're talking about 1.5 STDEVs above, or in roughly the 94th percentile. The number of GMAT test-takers last year was 267000. We'll assume all single, unique testers for this little exercise.
With a total pool of 267000 GMAT test takers, we look at what a score of 690 means percentage-wise (set the mean to 538 and stdev to 100, then move the cursor to 690), multiply by the total GMAT population, and end up with a total of... 16000 people with a minimum 690 GMAT score. With a 730 GMAT, it becomes 8000 people. Are all those people applying to the same schools? There may be some overlap, but let's posit that that all the smart people (690 GMAT and above) apply to the top 10 schools. With average class sizes being about 560, we're talking a total of 5600 top-program slots available. Assuming that only this year's GMAT takers apply, this means that if everybody with a 690 or above--throughout the world--applied to these top 10 B-schools, we'd see a 30% admit rate.
This isn't even counting the next 10 ranked b-schools, or other top-ranked international schools, etc. Wow, the odds just get better and better for scores in that top 6%, don't they? This tells me that there are a lot of people applying with sub-super GMAT scores, and that those people comprise the majority of the exclusive schools' rejects.
This isn't even counting the next 10 ranked b-schools, or other top-ranked international schools, etc. Wow, the odds just get better and better for scores in that top 6%, don't they? This tells me that there are a lot of people applying with sub-super GMAT scores, and that those people comprise the majority of the exclusive schools' rejects.
Now, I could be totally off base and all the normal people could be scared off by the high mean GMAT of the schools. However, this doesn't pass the sniff test. If I'm average Joe, I might not apply to the exclusive school... but the cost of the application (in time and money) might be worth the return, especially because I know the school admits at least a few low-end scores. Might be my lucky day, or something.
What we do know then is that a lot of folks apply to multiple schools, and we have a lot of lower-tier GMAT applicants as well. We also know that top schools admit mostly top GMAT performers.
Keep in mind that the GMAT takers number includes International students as well, which are taking the GMAT in equal or greater numbers to US takers. What I am leaving out of my analysis is the folks who have legacy GMAT scores (like who keep scores on file for a couple of years and then apply) because 1) not all of the top GMAT takers apply to the exclusive schools, 2) not all GMAT takers apply to schools period, and 3) it's a rolling process, so I assume that the carry-overs from last year replace the ones who wait this year.
So what is the takeaway? If you're applying to a top B-School or other school that requires the GMAT, and you're facing great odds... like the 10000 apps vs 1000 slots crunch... and you have a high GMAT, you probably don't have to worry about quite as much as you thought you did. And you can still tell people you got into a really selective school.
If you had an average GMAT, then you need to be really really special, because you're competing with the high scores that comprise the majority of slots, and the low-scores are relatively rare at the selective schools.
I still want to see the applicant pool profile. But I suspect we never will, because it would mean too much in prestige and applications revenue.
Feedback and help with my math would be greatly appreciated.
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Union Theory
This will be a short post, as I am not an economist and haven't done any research on the post-topic. Also, my jargon will be off because I haven't taken econ in years.
Here it is.
Thesis: Adding constraints or invalidating economic assumptions creates market distortions.
No suprise there, right?
Sub-Thesis: Labor unions are an externality caused by the invalidation of the homo economicus assumption of perfect mobility.
Explanation: When I learned about labor markets in Econ 101, I learned that labor is a commodity (more or less) with its supply and demand curves, et cetera. One of the things that had to be accounted for in assessing prices and elasticity and so forth was the degree of mobility of the labor in question. Now, it seems that unions were created because workers weren't getting paid commensurate with their working conditions and labor. The only reason this could have happened is that there were no other acceptable jobs around, and that the workers couldn't move to the jobs they wanted.
Whether those jobs actually existed is irrelevant to this point.
Now, as the workers couldn't move to a better job, there was a market distortion that benefited the employers, namely a lack of competition for labor. The employers essentially had a captive labor pool and could pay less than competitive-market prices. So, as the unions formed, they essentially functioned as a substitute for the perfect mobility that the workers lacked. They acted as an indirect competitor with the original employer. This moved the overall supply/demand curve intersection to a point closer to that of optimal efficiency.
This suggests that there is an economically optimal amount of union involvement in a given labor pool or situation. That amount would be just enough to balance the degree of invalidation in the labor-supply-assumption, or perfect mobility, whatever you want to call it. Further, if there's an optimal amount of union involvement, that means that there are sub-optimal levels-- too high, and too low--and those levels can be determined and compared against reality.
This is a fun academic exercise. I think it describes why unions formed and a bit of their history. For predictive theory, it seems that unions would thrive in environments where the facilities are fixed and labor pools are specialized (hence, they have imperfect mobility) and be unable to keep a foothold where labor is fungible and facilities are widely distributed (or where mobility is greater). Does this accurately describe reality?
It does not describe union pension plans, however-- I think that will take a more deliberate thought-experiment to explain.
Here it is.
Thesis: Adding constraints or invalidating economic assumptions creates market distortions.
No suprise there, right?
Sub-Thesis: Labor unions are an externality caused by the invalidation of the homo economicus assumption of perfect mobility.
Explanation: When I learned about labor markets in Econ 101, I learned that labor is a commodity (more or less) with its supply and demand curves, et cetera. One of the things that had to be accounted for in assessing prices and elasticity and so forth was the degree of mobility of the labor in question. Now, it seems that unions were created because workers weren't getting paid commensurate with their working conditions and labor. The only reason this could have happened is that there were no other acceptable jobs around, and that the workers couldn't move to the jobs they wanted.
Whether those jobs actually existed is irrelevant to this point.
Now, as the workers couldn't move to a better job, there was a market distortion that benefited the employers, namely a lack of competition for labor. The employers essentially had a captive labor pool and could pay less than competitive-market prices. So, as the unions formed, they essentially functioned as a substitute for the perfect mobility that the workers lacked. They acted as an indirect competitor with the original employer. This moved the overall supply/demand curve intersection to a point closer to that of optimal efficiency.
This suggests that there is an economically optimal amount of union involvement in a given labor pool or situation. That amount would be just enough to balance the degree of invalidation in the labor-supply-assumption, or perfect mobility, whatever you want to call it. Further, if there's an optimal amount of union involvement, that means that there are sub-optimal levels-- too high, and too low--and those levels can be determined and compared against reality.
This is a fun academic exercise. I think it describes why unions formed and a bit of their history. For predictive theory, it seems that unions would thrive in environments where the facilities are fixed and labor pools are specialized (hence, they have imperfect mobility) and be unable to keep a foothold where labor is fungible and facilities are widely distributed (or where mobility is greater). Does this accurately describe reality?
It does not describe union pension plans, however-- I think that will take a more deliberate thought-experiment to explain.
Baghdad Election Booms
This evening I heard small-arms fire (like AK-47s) and explosions (probably RPGs) in the distance as I walked to my CHU. Over the last several days, we've seen embassy bombings and a massacre. It seems as though there is mischief afoot.
Personally, I am glad this is happening now. Here's why: We are still here. I would wager that the recent spate of violence is directly related to the recent elections and the Iraqi people's empowerment of Ahmed Allawi. This did two things. First, it emboldened Al-Qaeda, which now have another Sunni (and former ba'athist) on the cusp of power. I don't think Allawi is a bad guy, as he pissed off Saddam pretty good, but he is likely tied through family and tribal relations to some bad people. Additionally, as he takes over the PM slot, he will inevitably replace current officials with those he prefers-- and those officials are more likely to be tied to Sunni extremist groups than the current officials. This all adds up to a political climate that might embolden Sunni groups, and I think that's what we're seeing now.
Now, the other side of the coin has the Shi'a contingent (like Nouri Al-Maliki and his contingent) not wanting to relinquish power to the newly-elected government. So there will be shenanigans from the Shi'a side of the house and its Iranian supporters as Maliki tries to create either a) a reason for him to stay in power, or b) um... another reason for him to stay in power.
This is why I am glad this is happening now. If Maliki had won, we would probably not be seeing the recent increase in violence. The long-term effect, however, would be that Iraq would have to go through its first eventual transfer of power on its own and later. Historically, transfers of power have been a hard thing for middle-eastern countries to deal with. See: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc. So for Iraq to confront this election and transfer of power now, when the US is still around to provide a stabilizing influence, is a very good thing over the long term.
There's nothing saying that the political situation won't vaporize when Allawi gets voted out of office in 4 years, but it's a lot more likely to go smoothly if we establish a positive precedent now. The confidence of the people in the process will go a long way to making this a permanent fixture. Then, in 20 years, we can look at this moment, right now, and say it was a defining point in Iraq's prosperity.
Personally, I am glad this is happening now. Here's why: We are still here. I would wager that the recent spate of violence is directly related to the recent elections and the Iraqi people's empowerment of Ahmed Allawi. This did two things. First, it emboldened Al-Qaeda, which now have another Sunni (and former ba'athist) on the cusp of power. I don't think Allawi is a bad guy, as he pissed off Saddam pretty good, but he is likely tied through family and tribal relations to some bad people. Additionally, as he takes over the PM slot, he will inevitably replace current officials with those he prefers-- and those officials are more likely to be tied to Sunni extremist groups than the current officials. This all adds up to a political climate that might embolden Sunni groups, and I think that's what we're seeing now.
Now, the other side of the coin has the Shi'a contingent (like Nouri Al-Maliki and his contingent) not wanting to relinquish power to the newly-elected government. So there will be shenanigans from the Shi'a side of the house and its Iranian supporters as Maliki tries to create either a) a reason for him to stay in power, or b) um... another reason for him to stay in power.
This is why I am glad this is happening now. If Maliki had won, we would probably not be seeing the recent increase in violence. The long-term effect, however, would be that Iraq would have to go through its first eventual transfer of power on its own and later. Historically, transfers of power have been a hard thing for middle-eastern countries to deal with. See: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, etc. So for Iraq to confront this election and transfer of power now, when the US is still around to provide a stabilizing influence, is a very good thing over the long term.
There's nothing saying that the political situation won't vaporize when Allawi gets voted out of office in 4 years, but it's a lot more likely to go smoothly if we establish a positive precedent now. The confidence of the people in the process will go a long way to making this a permanent fixture. Then, in 20 years, we can look at this moment, right now, and say it was a defining point in Iraq's prosperity.
Tuesday, March 30, 2010
Surefire controversy!
Let's talk Don't Ask, Don't Tell a bit. I have served in all-male light infantry and motorized line infantry units, co-ed training units, and co-ed staff units. I went to the Military Academy, which is a co-ed institution with approximately 17% of the student body being female. My experience is wide enough that I have a fairly good idea of what goes on in the Army and can therefore comment on some impacts of the policy popularly known as Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT).
First, let's posit a few things.
1. Any policy affecting or regulating the military ought to be crafted with the explicit aim of enhancing the capability of the armed forces. I hope this is apparent. If you disagree with me on this, then stop reading and go do something else.
2. Military capability is a function of the total equipment, personnel, and leadership/organizational activity of the military. It means the ability to deliver the right force to the right target in the right place at the right time.
3. There are trade-offs inherent in every policy. To make an analogy, a pawn may move two spaces forward, which is an advance, but the trade-off is that it loses control of the squares it has passed.
Ok, great. Now we are on the same page. So let's address some points about DADT.
The first is a pretty big one that most people seem to miss. DADT does NOT PREVENT gays from serving in the military.
Let me say that again because it is an important point.
DADT does NOT PREVENT gays from serving in the military.
What it prevents is gays from OPENLY serving in the military. What does that mean? That means engaging openly in gay behavior. The line is a little ambiguous, but public displays of affection such as kissing, or getting caught in flagrante are sufficient to open an investigation into the behavior.
But nothing in the policy prevents gay servicemembers from serving, provided they do not publish their orientation to the world to see. And that's the rub. There could be a couple of infantrymen, gay as can be, serving in a line unit, and, for example, living in their own off-post house, doing whatever they wanted to do. And there's nothing the Army could do about it. All that would be required is that they not make out in the barracks in front of their soldiers.
So, you say, the policy is still discriminatory. Well, yes, yes it is. But let's go back to our propositions: Looking at #1, would repealing DADT enhance military capability? I don't think so, and here's why.
1) Gays are already allowed to serve in the military; those who want to can, and therefore the military is not losing a valuable source of manpower. The best (and only, as far as I am concerned) arguments for allowing blacks, women, and etc into the army and integrated units concern the usage of the whole population of the US in military endeavors.
Fairness, taking into account peoples' desire to serve, etc., should have nothing to do with whether they are allowed to serve. To make the point: If a paraplegic wants to serve in the infantry, do we let him? If he is a superior strategic genius, then maybe he should be made a general. However, he is incapable of doing common Infantry tasks. Women (~50% of the population) and minorities (~30% of the population) give valuable contributions to the military, and so the integration effort was well-aimed and well-implemented, despite the negative effects that we do see in co-ed units from a high-percentage male population interacting with a low-percentage female population, especially given the framework of the rank system. There is no such argument for repealing DADT, because gays (2-3% of the population) are already allowed in the military. Repealing DADT would be an exercise in enhancing gay self-esteem, not military readiness. Consequently, the negative effects that we can anticipate--to unit readiness and morale-- are NOT outweighed by the benefits.
Because it would not be a beneficial policy, I am forced to conclude that the campaign to repeal DADT is not based so much on "gay rights" as it is on "I'm Gay, Look At Me!" In short, it is about the individual's freedom to do what you want. Freedom is great-- I am a huge fan of it. And I am leaving the military so I can do what I want. There are tradeoffs (see my #3 above) to every decision. The military demands some degree of conformity. If you can't handle it, don't join-- you know what you're getting into when you sign up. However, DADT-repeal proponents would rather force an institution to change for a few individuals' lifestyle preferences than recognize that what they are doing is not in the best interest of the military.
We then have a branch. Would DADT repeal be detrimental to the military? I don't know for sure. I can say that with the coming confluence of gay marriage and military benefits, I would bet a month's paycheck that with those policies in place, most of my all-male infantry platoon would have gotten "married" to be allowed to use off-post housing and get BAH. I can't say that my platoon would be significantly degraded by this, but I think getting my soldiers in formation in the morning would be a lot more difficult, and I would see a lot more legal problems coming out of Animal-House style quarters. I could be wrong, but that's where I would see things going.
I would also guess that living quarters for military service members in general would be dramatically reconfigured. There would no longer be ANY justification for segregating housing by sex.
Read that again, and think about it. It's absolutely correct. What is the justification for segregating housing by sex now? Privacy? Sexual harassment cases? When DADT goes, housing segregation by sex will (logically, but the army doesn't always follow logic) go too. As a result, service-members will have to have each of their own rooms. This is great for the servicemembers and I am all in favor of it generally, but not for the cause celebre of some individuals.
You will notice that I haven't addressed the morale., etc,. of the people in the units. That is intentional. My platoons could probably be assessed as homophobic, but I am not sure how much of that was peer-pressure induced and how much of it was genuinely being bothered by gays. I don't think integrating gays into the units themselves would be a problem unless you had gay romances going on. That is a problem in male-female integrated units as well, and can have a significant detrimental effect on unit readiness. It goes to a lot of fraternization issues. If those could be avoided (which I don't think is entirely realistic) then there wouldn't be a big problem.
However, let me make a point here: forcing people to change their beliefs for the sake of forcing them to change is egotistical and wrong. If there is an injustice going on, fine. But to label a group of people ("the military") as being mentally deficient and requiring them to adjust to accommodate a relative few individuals is not the best use of the military's already poorly-managed time and energy. There are already copious opportunities (mandates) for quarterly and yearly training on suicide, sexual harassment, equal opportunity, and so forth. I got more time in EO classes in my training at Fort Riley than I did training on IVs or calling MEDEVAC. Just sayin'.
Although to be fair I suppose I am at more risk of an EO complaint here on staff than I am of getting blown up. But if I'd gone to Afghanistan, then I'd have a real point.
Are we willing to accept the upheaval that repealing DADT will cause? I personally don't think there's a point to it. We should go with my marriage policy, and DADT in place.
Feedback is welcome, as are additional facts or commentary.
Saturday, March 20, 2010
Organizational Ownership Phenomenon
I attended a hail-and-farewell today. For those of you who haven't attended one, it's one of a long list of Army functions that purport to be tradition and morale-building but actually serves to suck up between one and 3 hours of potentially productive time. Last night, for instance, over the course of an hour-and-a-half, we learned exactly who of the incoming and outgoing personnel in the 3 shop were married, and some of what they were going to do once re-deployed. A Colonel sang Irish songs in honor of St. Patrick's Day. Though all this is no doubt crucial to individual self-esteem and a well-deserved recognition after a year of service in Iraq, I can't remember a single person except the specialist who was publicly mocked by the Sergeant Major for being fat and interested in fantasy role-playing games. It was a near-total waste of time, except that I got some chicken wings and was able to assess the male/female ratio on the J3 staff to be approximately 20:1.
However, one productive thing did come out of this event. I came up with yet another reason that the Army is possessed of strong organizational inertia--that is to say, why it doesn't change. The fact that everybody in this Force-level staff changed out in the period of about a month clued me into this: Since the typical tour of duty in the Army is between one and three years, no officer has any incentive to take actions to improve his organization past his individual time-frame.
Hypothesis: Organizational ownership increases with the anticipated tenure of the individual in the organization. Ray Kroc and Sam Walton had tremendous senses of organizational ownership because their lives were tied up in growing their businesses. The typical wal-mart clerk is probably not as enthusiastic. Likewise, Army officers who constantly change units have no incentive to view their role in the Army in light of the long-term good of their immediate organization because they are moving around so much.
Individual officers do not have the capability or incentives to work on anything that will outlast them. Therefore, they focus on short-cycle projects that will produce immediate tangible results. This is where the current deployment-refit-train- cycle (I think it's called something like "Life Cycle Units, or Rotational Readiness program or etc) is very beneficial to the commander. He works through the cycle, declares victory, and goes on to his next assignment. He has no staying power or ability to influence anything in his organization past his RIP/TOA date.
This phenomenon is not strictly limited to officers, but it seems to hit them harder. Within 2 months of my last deployment ending, I'd estimate that 90% of officer-positions changed hands.
So what's the problem? Well, let me make an analogy: Publicly traded businesses are often derided for taking courses of action that benefit their share prices in the short-term without regard for moral hazard or long-term consequences. Just think about the recent banking collapse if you need an example. They are pressured by the public clamor to keep share prices up. This prevents them from taking actions that might be beneficial to the long-term health of the company (i.e. shedding lines of business, layoffs, etc) but are unpopular.
Apply this to the Army. A unit commander (or other officer, but I will say "commander" here to keep it simple) has a short-term goal, just like keeping share prices high: Career advancement, i.e. his OER. After his 2 or 3 years, he moves on to another position in another organization, or a different shop within the same organization-- but more commonly the former. So his incentive is to do whatever he can do NOW, because he is a) rated on his short term performance, and b) he will not be around long enough to see any long-term projects to completion--hence, anything that has a less-than-sexy performance in the immediate term will hurt him. Thus, problems have a tendency to be ignored or put off until the rotation happens, to let the next guy deal with it.
So because officers are moved around so much, they have no incentives to take on long-term unit improvements. They focus on the immediate train-deploy cycle. They focus on their immediate tour and not on how to build the battalion over years.
But, you ask, isn't that a good thing because of cumulative improvement to the unit? Surely new commanders, all full of piss and vinegar, reinvigorate organizations and keep them wired tight.
You'd think so, but then account for the fact that all the expertise and teamwork built up during that time frame is constantly decimated by OTHER officers moving around. The WHOLE ORGANIZATION can change in a period of a couple of months. Because officers are the ones that set the training and operational agenda, every time a command position changes hands, there is a reorientation of priorities throughout the unit. Everyone has to adjust to the new boss. This can happen en-masse--like when the battalion commander and company commanders all change at roughly the same time-- or it can happen piecemeal, with platoon leader rotations, company commander changes, etc. But every time there is a change, the ship has to adjust course. In fact, a time-honored tradition in the Army is assuming authority and declaring that the last guy was all messed up and the situation needs to be fixed. Maybe our current CoC knows something about military culture after all.
The required re-org and re-orientation following personnel turnover simply further reduces the ability of everybody else to make long-term change or adjustments that would improve the organization. Everybody has to drop what they're doing and learn what the new boss wants.
What kind of long-term organizational improvements are we talking about?
How about winning wars? If postings to combat zones were permanent, would we win faster? How about equipment and accountability problems? If officers couldn't kick the can down the road as easily, then they might be able and motivated to take action to fix problems.
By the way, this post nicely supports my idea for a free-market HR department, in which units and individuals work at common interests to find good organizational fits, and then retain the leaders that are worth a damn.
However, one productive thing did come out of this event. I came up with yet another reason that the Army is possessed of strong organizational inertia--that is to say, why it doesn't change. The fact that everybody in this Force-level staff changed out in the period of about a month clued me into this: Since the typical tour of duty in the Army is between one and three years, no officer has any incentive to take actions to improve his organization past his individual time-frame.
Hypothesis: Organizational ownership increases with the anticipated tenure of the individual in the organization. Ray Kroc and Sam Walton had tremendous senses of organizational ownership because their lives were tied up in growing their businesses. The typical wal-mart clerk is probably not as enthusiastic. Likewise, Army officers who constantly change units have no incentive to view their role in the Army in light of the long-term good of their immediate organization because they are moving around so much.
Individual officers do not have the capability or incentives to work on anything that will outlast them. Therefore, they focus on short-cycle projects that will produce immediate tangible results. This is where the current deployment-refit-train- cycle (I think it's called something like "Life Cycle Units, or Rotational Readiness program or etc) is very beneficial to the commander. He works through the cycle, declares victory, and goes on to his next assignment. He has no staying power or ability to influence anything in his organization past his RIP/TOA date.
This phenomenon is not strictly limited to officers, but it seems to hit them harder. Within 2 months of my last deployment ending, I'd estimate that 90% of officer-positions changed hands.
So what's the problem? Well, let me make an analogy: Publicly traded businesses are often derided for taking courses of action that benefit their share prices in the short-term without regard for moral hazard or long-term consequences. Just think about the recent banking collapse if you need an example. They are pressured by the public clamor to keep share prices up. This prevents them from taking actions that might be beneficial to the long-term health of the company (i.e. shedding lines of business, layoffs, etc) but are unpopular.
Apply this to the Army. A unit commander (or other officer, but I will say "commander" here to keep it simple) has a short-term goal, just like keeping share prices high: Career advancement, i.e. his OER. After his 2 or 3 years, he moves on to another position in another organization, or a different shop within the same organization-- but more commonly the former. So his incentive is to do whatever he can do NOW, because he is a) rated on his short term performance, and b) he will not be around long enough to see any long-term projects to completion--hence, anything that has a less-than-sexy performance in the immediate term will hurt him. Thus, problems have a tendency to be ignored or put off until the rotation happens, to let the next guy deal with it.
So because officers are moved around so much, they have no incentives to take on long-term unit improvements. They focus on the immediate train-deploy cycle. They focus on their immediate tour and not on how to build the battalion over years.
But, you ask, isn't that a good thing because of cumulative improvement to the unit? Surely new commanders, all full of piss and vinegar, reinvigorate organizations and keep them wired tight.
You'd think so, but then account for the fact that all the expertise and teamwork built up during that time frame is constantly decimated by OTHER officers moving around. The WHOLE ORGANIZATION can change in a period of a couple of months. Because officers are the ones that set the training and operational agenda, every time a command position changes hands, there is a reorientation of priorities throughout the unit. Everyone has to adjust to the new boss. This can happen en-masse--like when the battalion commander and company commanders all change at roughly the same time-- or it can happen piecemeal, with platoon leader rotations, company commander changes, etc. But every time there is a change, the ship has to adjust course. In fact, a time-honored tradition in the Army is assuming authority and declaring that the last guy was all messed up and the situation needs to be fixed. Maybe our current CoC knows something about military culture after all.
The required re-org and re-orientation following personnel turnover simply further reduces the ability of everybody else to make long-term change or adjustments that would improve the organization. Everybody has to drop what they're doing and learn what the new boss wants.
What kind of long-term organizational improvements are we talking about?
How about winning wars? If postings to combat zones were permanent, would we win faster? How about equipment and accountability problems? If officers couldn't kick the can down the road as easily, then they might be able and motivated to take action to fix problems.
By the way, this post nicely supports my idea for a free-market HR department, in which units and individuals work at common interests to find good organizational fits, and then retain the leaders that are worth a damn.
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